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THE FADING FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
René Reyes*

ABSTRACT
This Article uses the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Christian Legal Society
v. Martinez as a point of departure for analyzing the current state of free exercise
doctrine. I argue that one of the most notable features of the Christian Legal Society
(CLS) case is its almost total lack of engagement with the Free Exercise Clause. For
the core of CLS’s complaint was unambiguously about the declaration and exercise
of religious beliefs: the group claimed that it was being excluded from campus life
because it required its members to live according to shared religious principles and
to subscribe to a Statement of Faith. Yet notwithstanding the clear religious basis of
its claims, CLS devoted a mere two pages to the Free Exercise Clause in its brief. The
Court’s Free Exercise Clause analysis was similarly elliptical: the majority dispensed
with the free exercise argument in a single footnote. For his part, Justice Alito did
not even mention the Free Exercise Clause once in his lengthy dissent.
What accounts for this paucity of treatment? The following sections explore
this question. I begin by tracing the fading status of the Free Exercise Clause from
Employment Division v. Smith in 1990 to Christian Legal Society v. Martinez in 2010.
I show that while the Clause has occasionally played a supporting role in Supreme
Court decisions over the past two decades, it has not provided an independent basis
for constitutional relief in a single case since 1993. I then suggest that the fact that
the Free Exercise Clause has become so doctrinally otiose is itself an argument for
reinvesting the Clause with independent meaning.
But what kind of meaning should it have? Unlike commentators who have reasoned that free exercise doctrine must either treat all citizens equally or give religious
believers special privileges, I outline an approach to the Free Exercise Clause that seeks
to accomplish both. Specifically, I propose that the Clause be reinvigorated to provide
some exemptions from generally-applicable laws for conscientious objectors—but
that these exemptions must be available to religious and secular claimants on an
equal footing. To illustrate how my proposal might operate in practice, I then apply
the reinvigorated Free Exercise Clause to Christian Legal Society v. Martinez itself.
I conclude that even though a reinvigorated Free Exercise Clause might not have
changed the result in the CLS case, there are nevertheless strong arguments in favor
of giving greater weight to the Clause in future cases.
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Villanova University School of Law (Fall 2010). J.D.
Harvard Law School, A.B. Harvard College.
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INTRODUCTION
At the end of the 2009 term, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez.1 The case involved a challenge to a University of California
Hastings College of Law policy that required student organizations to accept “all
comers” in order to receive official recognition, use campus communication networks,
and apply for financial assistance through the law school’s student-activity fee fund.2
The challenge was brought by the Hastings chapter of the Christian Legal Society
(CLS), whose bylaws required members and officers to subscribe to a “Statement
of Faith” and to live in accordance with certain beliefs and values.3 These bylaws
operated to disqualify from membership any students who engaged in “unrepentant
homosexual conduct” or who held “religious convictions different from those in the
Statement of Faith.”4 Hastings concluded that CLS’s bylaws did not comply with the
school’s nondiscrimination policy and refused to grant the group official status as a
Registered Student Organization (“RSO”).5 CLS brought suit, claiming that Hastings’s
refusal to grant it RSO status violated the organization’s rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion.6 The Supreme Court rejected all of
CLS’s claims.7 Applying limited public forum doctrine, the Court held by a vote of 5-4
that Hastings’s policy was both reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.8 In sum, while “[t]he
First Amendment shields CLS against state prohibition of [its] expressive activity,
however exclusionary that activity may be,” the organization “enjoys no constitutional
right to state subvention of its selectivity.”9
Early assessments of the significance of the CLS decision have been decidedly
mixed. Robert Vischer, for example, has opined that the decision is a significant one
indeed—though not necessarily at the level of constitutional doctrine.10 Rather, Vischer
finds the decision noteworthy at the level of political discourse about diversity, discrimination, and associational freedom. He emphasizes the need “to help deepen our public
discourse about discrimination and diversity to include recognition that associational
diversity is a key component of religious and moral liberty,” and appears dismayed by
“the shared mindset that appears to have animated the law school’s actions and the
1

130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
Id. at 2979.
3
Id. at 2980.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 2980–81.
6
Id. at 2981.
7
Id. at 2981–82.
8
Id. at 2978.
9
Id.
10
Robert K. Vischer, Diversity and Discrimination in the Case of the Christian Legal
Society, PUBLIC DISCOURSE: ETHICS, LAW, AND THE COMMON GOOD (July 9, 2010), http://
www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2010/07/1410.
2
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Justices’ interpretation and evaluation of those actions as reasonable.”11 But while
Vischer criticizes the Justices for failing to appreciate the nature and strength of CLS’s
associational freedom claims, he nevertheless commends them for distinguishing
between the legality and advisability of Hastings’s policy.12 Thus, however misguided the Court’s opinion may have been, it does not necessarily mark the end of the
debate: for public actors may yet recognize that “even if a university now has the right
to make all groups accept everyone, it is a right best left unexercised.”13
By contrast, Steven Shiffrin finds the majority opinion rather unremarkable and
“do[es] not see the law declared in the Christian Legal Society case as a serious blow
to freedom of religion or freedom of speech.”14 Shiffrin’s conclusion is supported
by the limits he notes in the opinion: it did not hold that Hastings could discriminate
against religious groups or ban groups with selective membership outright; it merely
held that Hastings did not have to formally recognize or subsidize those groups.15
Shiffrin does express doubt about the wisdom of an “all-comers” policy and voices
concern that such a policy could potentially hide discriminatory motivations.16 But
as long as groups like CLS retain some access to campus facilities and to alternative
means of communication with other students—and for purposes of its opinion, the
majority assumed that CLS did have such access—then Shiffrin does “not think this
case is very significant.”17
Vikram David Amar takes a position somewhere between those of Vischer and
Shiffrin: he agrees that CLS v. Martinez is a significant case, but not because of its
impact on religious freedom. In his view, the case is significant for what it teaches
about the importance of factual concessions and doctrinal frameworks.18 CLS made
two key concessions in this case: 1) that Hastings had created a limited public forum,
and 2) that Hastings’s policy requires student groups to accept all comers.19 Once
these concessions had been made, it was relatively easy for the Court to conclude that
limited public forum doctrine was the applicable standard and that Hastings’s policy
was viewpoint neutral.20 Of course, Hastings’s policy also had to be reasonable to pass
constitutional muster. This requirement leads to the third lesson Amar draws from the
11

Id.
Id.
13
Id.
14
Steven Shiffrin, The Insignificance of the Christian Legal Society Case, RELIGIOUSLEFT
LAW (June 30, 2010, 5:15AM), http://www.religiousleftlaw.com/2010/06/the-insignificance-of
-the-christian-legal-society-case.html.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Vikram David Amar, What the CLS v. Martinez Ruling Reveals About the Supreme
Court’s Processes, FINDLAW (July 2, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20100702.html.
19
Id.
20
Id.
12
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case—i.e., that the Court is reluctant to second-guess institutional judgments when
evaluating the reasonableness of educational policies at colleges and universities.21
The reactions of Vischer, Shiffrin, and Amar are broadly representative of the narratives that have emerged thus far about CLS v. Martinez.22 However, this Article offers
a different take on the case. I argue that the case’s primary significance does not derive
from what it says about factual stipulations, limited forum doctrine, or associational
freedom under the Free Speech Clause. Instead, I argue that its primary significance
derives from what it says—or rather fails to say—about the Free Exercise Clause.
Indeed, the absence of engagement with the Free Exercise Clause in this case is
striking. For the core of CLS’s complaint was unambiguously about the declaration
and exercise of religious beliefs. The group claimed that it was being excluded from
campus life because it required its members to live according to shared religious principles and to sign a Statement of Faith—one that included declarations of belief in
“God the Father Almighty,” the “Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ,” and “[t]he Bible
as the inspired Word of God.”23 Yet notwithstanding the clear religious basis of its
claims, CLS devoted a mere two pages to the Free Exercise Clause in its brief24 (a
summary treatment that Hastings characterized as “half-hearted” and “telling” in its
own brief).25 The Court’s Free Exercise Clause analysis was similarly elliptical: the
majority dispensed with the free exercise argument in a single footnote.26 For his part,
Justice Alito did not even mention the Free Exercise Clause once in his lengthy dissent.
What accounts for this paucity of treatment? The remainder of this Article explores
this question. At one level, the explanation is simple: the 1990 case of Employment
Division v. Smith substantially curtailed the scope of the Free Exercise Clause by holding that religious claimants were not entitled to exemptions from neutral and generallyapplicable laws.27 But even Smith held open the possibility that the Free Exercise
21

Id.
See, e.g., Richard Garnett, What Would Kagan Do?, USA TODAY, July 26, 2010, at 9A
(“[T]he court should not have deferred to the law-school’s ‘all comers’ rule. True, the policy
might seem, at first glance, to promote [an] inclusive political community . . . . In fact, though,
it excludes from the law school’s common life groups with distinctive identities and penalizes the view that members’ beliefs matter to the group’s shared purpose.”); Michael Dorf,
A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Designated Public Forum, DORF ON
LAW (July 14, 2010, 2:22 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/07/funny-thing-happened-on
-way-to-limited.html (citing Amar, supra note 18, and discussing factual concessions by CLS);
Stanley Fish, Being Neutral Is Oh So Hard to Do, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (July 19, 2010,
9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/being-neutral-is-oh-so-hard-to-do/
?ref=opinion (“Under cover of ‘neutrality,’ Hastings, with the majority’s approval, is imposing the goals and ideology of liberal multiculturalism on the very diverse members of the law
school’s community.”).
23
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971, 2980 n.3 (2010).
24
Brief for Petitioner at 40–41, Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371).
25
Brief of Respondents at 49, Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371).
26
Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2995 n.27.
27
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
22
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Clause could have constitutional force in cases involving “hybrid” claims—i.e.,
cases in which free exercise claims were combined with other claims, including free
speech claims.28 Thus, in 2001, Mark Tushnet observed that while the Free Exercise
Clause might have become redundant in many instances, it could still have sufficient
“residual” effect to make a meaningful difference in other instances.29 The CLS case,
however, suggests that the Free Exercise Clause is rapidly fading beyond redundancy
into irrelevance.
In the sections below, I trace and analyze the doctrinal demise of the Free Exercise
Clause from Smith through CLS. I show that while the Clause has occasionally played
a supporting role in Supreme Court decisions over the past two decades, it has not
provided an independent basis for constitutional relief in a single case since 1993. I
then consider some of the implications of this development, focusing on the claim that
the Free Exercise Clause should be re-invested with independent significance. I also
consider how a more robust interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause might have
played out in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. I conclude that even though a reinvigorated Free Exercise Clause might not have changed the result in the CLS case
itself, there are nevertheless strong arguments in favor of giving greater weight to
the Clause in future cases.
I. THE FADING OF FREE EXERCISE DOCTRINE
As noted above, the current state of free exercise doctrine traces its origins to
Employment Division v. Smith. The case was brought by members of a Native
American church whose rites involved the sacramental consumption of peyote.30
State drug laws prohibited possession of the hallucinogenic substance, but the
church members argued that consumption of peyote was central to their religious beliefs and practices and claimed that they were entitled to an exemption from the law
under the Free Exercise Clause.31 In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court
held that the Free Exercise Clause required no such exemptions.32 Although the Court
had evaluated free exercise cases under the “compelling state interest” standard for
28

Id. at 881–82 (discussing cases in which free exercise claims were combined with claims
involving parental rights, freedom of speech and press, or freedom of association).
29
Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71, 91–92
(2001) (discussing cases “[i]n which a free exercise claim that would be insufficient standing
alone to trigger close examination of the challenged government conduct is joined with some
other constitutionally rooted claim that would be insufficient standing alone to do so as well”);
see also Daniel O. Conkle, The Free Exercise Clause: How Redundant, and Why?, 33 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 95, 115 (2001) (arguing that in some cases, the Free Exercise Clause “does no
independent doctrinal work, but it does do important doctrinal work,” and “[t]o this extent,
the Clause is not redundant”).
30
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
31
Id. at 874, 878.
32
Id. at 885.
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decades,33 the Smith majority rejected that standard in favor of a much more lenient
test.34 Henceforth, laws burdening religious exercise need only be neutral and of general applicability to survive constitutional scrutiny; as long as a prohibition of religious
practice was not the purpose “but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”35
The Smith decision thus marked a significant change in free exercise jurisprudence, and it generated an outpouring of objections. In academe, a number of prominent
scholars criticized the decision on precedential, historical, and normative grounds.36
In Congress, legislators passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in a
bipartisan effort to overrule Smith and restore the compelling interest standard.37 A
discernable concern behind both the scholarship and the legislation was that Smith
had seriously undermined religious liberty, and that religious minorities in particular
would be left without constitutional protection from discrimination in matters of belief
and practice.38
This fear was not to be realized—at least not in the next Free Exercise Clause
to reach the Court. That case was Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,39
33

See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–07 (1963) (holding that a “substantial infringement” on religious liberty must be justified by a “compelling state interest”). However,
some commentators have argued that this heightened standard was rarely applied with much
impact in the majority of cases. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 42 (2007) (“Not surprisingly, courts, while
paying lip service to the Sherbert case and its compelling state interest test in free exercise
cases, in practice shied away from this radical prescription.”).
34
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884–85 (holding the Sherbert test inapplicable to challenges to
“generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct”).
35
Id. at 878.
36
See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 147–74 (2008); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of
Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (noting criticism of Smith); Michael McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism] (same). While much of the commentary on Smith has
been critical, some of it has also been supportive. See, e.g., EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note
33, at 78–81;William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991).
37
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2008). RFRA was ultimately struck down by the Supreme Court
as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), which held that the
statute exceeded Congress’s enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute remains in effect as applied to the federal government. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita
Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
38
This concern may have been driven by the Court’s observation that “[i]t may fairly be
said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage
those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of
democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto
itself. . . .” Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
39
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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decided three years after Smith. The petitioners were members of a church that practiced the Santeria religion, which involves the ritual sacrifice of animals.40 When
church members leased property in the city of Hialeah with the intention of opening
a house of worship, the city council responded by enacting a series of resolutions and
ordinances.41 The first expressed “concern . . . that certain religions may propose
to engage in practices which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety.”42
Subsequent enactments effectively banned central components of Santeria worship,
declaring it to be “unlawful for any person . . . to sacrifice any animal within the
corporate limits of the City of Hialeah, Florida.”43 Church members challenged the
ordinances under the Free Exercise Clause.44
The Supreme Court applied the Smith standard to petitioners’ claims.45 The Court
first held that facial neutrality in a law was not sufficient to end the constitutional
inquiry, and proceeded to find that the record “compel[led] the conclusion that suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service was the object of the
ordinances.”46 Consequently, the challenged laws could not be considered neutral as
required by Smith.47 Nor could the laws be considered generally applicable: for they
pursued the government’s professed interest in preventing animal cruelty “only against
conduct motivated by religious belief.”48 The ordinances could therefore only survive
if they were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest—for even
after Smith, laws that single out religious conduct for prohibition are subject to strict
scrutiny.49 Given that Hialeah’s ordinances failed the relatively lenient Smith standard,
it was no surprise that they also failed the more rigorous compelling interest standard.50
While Lukumi resulted in a favorable outcome for petitioners, the free exercise
implications of the case are fairly limited. True, the Court once again applied the compelling interest test to vindicate the rights of religious minorities, and did so in a case
that was decided under the Free Exercise Clause alone—for Lukumi was not evaluated
as a “hybrid” case of the sort mentioned in Smith.51 Lukumi can thus be read to belie
the claim that Smith deprived the Free Exercise Clause of meaningful content. But
40

Id. at 525–26.
Id.
42
Id. at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43
Id. at 528 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 531–32.
46
Id. at 534.
47
Id. at 533, 542.
48
Id. at 545.
49
Id. at 546–47.
50
Id.
51
However, the case arguably presented hybrid issues that could have been decided on
other grounds. See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 76 & n. 27 (arguing that the Free Speech Clause’s
ban on viewpoint discrimination would have produced the same result as the Free Exercise
Clause).
41
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at the same time, there was no suggestion that the Lukumi majority was limiting or
retreating from the holding of Smith in any way.52 Moreover, the Court plainly viewed
Lukumi as an exceptional case. Justice Kennedy began his majority opinion by noting
that “[t]he principle that government may not enact laws that suppress religious belief
or practice is so well understood that few violations are recorded in our opinions.”53
Hence, it is not clear how much significance the case has outside of those rare instances
in which a particular religious practice is the target of obvious discrimination.54 But one
thing about the case is clear: it did not lead to a resurgence of successful free exercise
claims at the Supreme Court level. Quite to the contrary: Lukumi would prove to be
the last case decided by the Court to date in which the Free Exercise Clause provided
the primary basis for relief.
This is not to say that the Free Exercise Clause disappeared from view entirely.
Rather, it simply faded from constitutional significance. The only case after Lukumi
to prominently feature a Free Exercise Clause claim was Locke v. Davey.55 The case
involved a challenge to the State of Washington’s Promise Scholarship Program,
which provides financial assistance to students pursuing post-secondary educational
opportunities.56 However, under state law, the scholarships may not be used to pursue
a degree in theology or other devotional studies.57 Respondent Davey was initially
awarded a Promise Scholarship but was denied funding after attempting to pursue a
double major in pastoral ministries and business.58 Davey brought suit, arguing that
the denial of funding violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause.59
In asserting his free exercise claims, Davey argued that the scholarship program
was not facially neutral with respect to religion and was therefore presumptively
unconstitutional under Lukumi—for the Washington program singled out religious
education for exclusion, much like the Hialeah ordinances had singled out religious
sacrifice for prohibition.60 Yet the Court rejected this argument.61 The Court distinguished the kind of disfavor of religion that was present in Lukumi from the “far
52

See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 892 (1994) (“The Court struck down these ordinances 9-0, but without
casting the slightest doubt on Smith. There seemed clearly to be six votes for Smith in the
Lukumi opinions.”).
53
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 523; see also Laycock, supra note 52, at 892 (discussing his decision
as counsel for petitioners to frame church’s appeal as religious discrimination case).
54
See Laycock, supra note 52, at 892 (“Here was one of the few cases the Supreme Court
had ever seen where government set out to suppress a single religion.”).
55
540 U.S. 712 (2004).
56
Id. at 715.
57
Id. at 716 (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 250-80-020(12)(f) to (g) (2003)).
58
Id. at 717.
59
Id. at 718. Davey also brought claims under the Free Speech and Equal Protection
Clauses, but the Court summarily rejected these claims in a footnote. See id. at 720, n.3.
60
Id. at 720.
61
Id.
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milder” kind that was present here: whereas the city criminalized certain religious
practices in the latter case, the State was imposing “neither criminal nor civil sanctions
on any type of religious service or rite” in the present case.62 Nor was the state denying theology students the right to participate in public life, or forcing students to give
up their beliefs in order to receive government benefits; it was simply declining to
fund “a distinct category of instruction.”63 In addition, there were strong historical
and constitutional reasons that supported the state’s decision not to fund devotional
studies. Government support for church leaders had generated public opposition since
the founding era, and was prohibited in many early state constitutions.64 In light of
these factors, the majority saw no evidence of the sort of hostility toward religion that
would justify a presumption of unconstitutionality.65 And in the absence of such a
presumption, the Court held that Davey’s claim must fail: “The State’s interest in not
funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars. If any room exists between
the two Religion Clauses, it must be here.”66
Davey is a significant case, in that it permits government to discriminate against
religion in funding cases without necessarily violating the Free Exercise Clause.67 In
this respect, it arguably erodes the scope of the Clause beyond the limits set out in
Smith and Lukumi. As Douglas Laycock has written:
The Smith-Lukumi rules ban facial discrimination against
religion as part of “the minimum requirement of neutrality.” Yet
Davey upholds facial discrimination against religion, without
requiring a compelling justification. An exception to the ban on
facial discrimination is surely also an exception to the ban on more
subtle forms of discrimination manifested in laws that are less than
generally applicable. Davey is thus an important exception to the
remaining protection for religious practice . . . .68

62

Id.
Id. at 720–21. With respect to benefits, the Court noted that Promise Scholars could still
receive funding for their secular studies if they pursued their devotional studies at a separate
institution. Id. at 721 n.4.
64
Id. at 722–23.
65
Id. at 724.
66
Id. at 725.
67
See Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious
Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 171 (2004)
(“From the perspective of the Court’s cases on discrimination against religion, [the Davey
holding] is remarkable. The Court had never before held that the state can discriminate against
religion.”).
68
Id. at 213–14 (internal citation omitted).
63
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Laycock repeatedly emphasizes that Davey is a funding case, and concludes that it has
limited implications outside of that context.69 But within that context he also concludes that the freedom to discriminate against religion is now quite broad and that
serious limitations are difficult to find.70
Davey thus reflects the fading of the Free Exercise Clause in two respects. First,
it demonstrates the declining force that the Clause offers to claims of religious discrimination. Second, it is the only case in the last seventeen years in which the Free Exercise
Clause has been at the front and center of a Supreme Court opinion. The Clause has
occasionally made appearances in other cases over this time period, but only in a
limited role—usually in support of a Free Speech claim. For example, in Watchtower
Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton,71 Jehovah’s Witnesses
brought a facial challenge to an ordinance that prohibited door-to-door advocacy without first obtaining a permit from the mayor’s office.72 While the petitioners wished to
engage in such door-to-door advocacy for religious purposes, the Court did not frame
its analysis solely or even primarily as a question of religious exercise.73 To the contrary, the Court began its opinion by explaining that it was considering the constitutionality of the ordinance “not only as it applies to religious proselytizing, but also to
anonymous political speech and the distribution of handbills.”74 The analysis that followed was consistent with this framing of the case. The Court emphasized the value
accorded to religious speech under the First Amendment and duly acknowledged the
role played by the Jehovah’s Witnesses in past pamphleteering cases;75 but it also
emphasized the general importance of door-to-door advocacy as a means of disseminating information and the fact that “the Jehovah’s Witnesses are not the only ‘little
people’ who face the risk of silencing by regulations like the Village’s.”76 But the real
constitutional defect in the ordinance was its dramatic breadth: it included both religious
causes and political activity, and seemingly extended as well to “residents casually
soliciting the votes of neighbors.”77 Such a broad ordinance threatened speakers’ rights
to freedom, anonymity, and spontaneity in speech.78 Compounding this defect, the
69

See id. at 183, 200, 216–18.
Laycock himself identifies a few possibilities. One is that the opinion indicates that government may not penalize religious activity by withholding funding that is available for nonreligious activity. Id. at 161. Furthermore, “[o]n its face, the holding is confined to the training
of clergy, to refusals to fund that are not based on hostility to religion, and to cases that do not
involve forums for speech.” Id. at 184. However, Laycock also concedes that “each of these
limitations may well turn out to be illusory.” Id. at 184.
71
536 U.S. 150 (2002).
72
Id. at 153.
73
See id. at 161–62.
74
Id. at 153.
75
Id. at 160–61.
76
Id. at 161–63.
77
Id. at 165 (quoting Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 n.4 (1976)).
78
Id. at 166–67.
70
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ordinance was not closely tailored to the government’s asserted interests in protecting residents’ privacy or preventing fraud and crime.79
The Watchtower case is perhaps a good illustration of the “redundant” Free
Exercise Clause described by Professor Tushnet.80 For while the Clause was included
among the petitioner’s claims and in the Court’s opinion, it was clearly not necessary to support the outcome.81 An even greater level of redundancy can be seen in
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,82 a case that was
cited several times in the CLS opinions.83 Rosenberger presented challenges to a
University of Virginia program that paid the printing costs of a broad range of student publications with funds collected through a mandatory student activities fee.84
Petitioners were members of a student organization that published a journal offering
“a Christian perspective on both personal and community issues, especially those relevant to college students at the University of Virginia.”85 The university refused to
cover the journal’s publication costs, citing a policy that excluded from eligibility any
publications that “promote[d] or manifest[ed] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity
or an ultimate reality.”86 Petitioners brought suit under a number of constitutional
provisions, including the Free Exercise Clause.87
However, the opening paragraph of the majority opinion made clear that the case
was to be analyzed through the lens of free speech doctrine.88 The Court engaged in
public forum analysis, and held that the university had created a limited forum through
its funding program and that the decision to exclude publications with a religious perspective amounted to impermissible viewpoint discrimination.89 It therefore followed
that “the regulation invoked to deny [financial] support, both in its terms and in its
application to these petitioners, is a denial of their right of free speech guaranteed by
the First Amendment.”90
79

Id. at 168.
See Tushnet, supra note 29.
81
Nor, it would seem, was it sufficient—for the ordinance was facially neutral with respect
to religion, and was not found to have been motivated by religious hostility. Watchtower, 536
U.S. at 158–59. And while he joined the majority opinion, Justice Scalia wrote separately to
express the view that had the ordinance been otherwise valid, it would not have lost its validity
simply because “some people will choose, for religious reasons, to forgo speech rather than
observe it.” Id. at 171 (Scalia, J., concurring).
82
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
83
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978, 2984–86, 2988, 2993 (2010);
id. at 2998–99 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 3009–11, 3013, 3016 (Alito, J., dissenting).
84
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824.
85
Id. at 826 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86
Id. at 827 (alterations in original).
87
Id. at 827.
88
Id. at 823.
89
Id. at 829–32.
90
Id. at 837. The Court proceeded to reject the University’s claim that funding to groups
with a religious viewpoint would violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 838–46.
80
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Despite the religious dimensions of the underlying controversy, Rosenberger is
properly understood as a case about the Free Speech Clause; the Free Exercise Clause
is doing none of the doctrinal work.91 And Rosenberger is in many ways analogous
to CLS, which partially explains why the parties and the Court focused on the Free
Speech Clause in both cases. However, there are also important differences between
the two cases—differences that make the absence of Free Exercise Clause analysis in
CLS much more notable than it was in Rosenberger and other cases. Rosenberger
really was about freedoms of speech and press in a fairly straightforward way: the
case was about funding of student newspapers with particular editorial viewpoints.92
At both the intuitive and constitutional level, it therefore made sense for free speech
analysis to take precedence over free exercise analysis. Similar observations can be
made about other cases in which the Free Exercise Clause has played a diminished
or redundant role.93
But the conceptual primacy of speech over religion is far less obvious in CLS.
The petitioners in CLS were ineligible for RSO status not because they wanted to
publish a journal, sponsor speakers and events, or engage in advocacy from a religious
perspective. They were ineligible because they wanted to do something more fundamentally religious: instead of accepting all comers, they wanted to limit membership
in their organization to those willing to sign a Statement of Faith and live their lives
according to the Christian principles contained therein.94 Surely a strong argument
91

The majority in Davey held that Rosenberger was inapplicable to its analysis precisely
because it was a speech case. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2003) (“Davey, relying
on Rosenberger . . . contends that the Promise Scholarship Program is an unconstitutional
viewpoint restriction on speech. But the Promise Scholarship Program is not a forum for
speech. . . . Our cases dealing with speech forums are simply inapplicable.”).
92
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825–27.
93
Watchtower, for example, involved a ban on all door-to-door pamphleteering and advocacy in the absence of a permit; religious advocacy was not isolated as the only concern of the
ordinance or of the Court’s opinion. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. Inc. v. Village
of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153 (2002); see also Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (applying free speech doctrine and holding that once the school
district created limited public forum by making facilities available for social and civic events,
it could not deny access to the group whose proposed event would have been permissible but
for its religious viewpoint).
94
The full text of the Statement of Faith is as follows:
Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in: One God, eternally
existent in three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. God the Father
Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth. The Deity of our Lord, Jesus
Christ, God’s only Son conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the virgin
Mary; His vicarious death for our sins through which we receive eternal
life; His bodily resurrection and personal return. The presence and power
of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration. The Bible as the inspired
Word of God.
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971, 2980 n.3 (2010).
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could be made that defining membership and administering rites of initiation is a core
component the free exercise of religion—but such arguments were barely mentioned
in the briefs and opinions in this case.95 Instead, the case was argued and decided
almost exclusively on free speech grounds.96
None of this is to suggest that the petitioners in CLS should have devoted more
attention to the Free Exercise Clause in arguing their case. As a matter of litigation
strategy, the decision to downplay the Free Exercise Clause was perfectly understandable—for as this section has amply demonstrated, the Clause no longer carries much
doctrinal weight and would likely not have lent much help to CLS’s cause. Rather,
the point is to illustrate the extent to which the Free Exercise Clause has faded from
constitutional significance. This fading is so complete that even in a case as unambiguously about religion as CLS, the Clause had nothing meaningful to contribute to
the analysis.97
Such is the state of contemporary Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. Smith and
Lukumi held that laws burdening religious exercise only had to be neutral and generallyapplicable to pass constitutional muster;98 the Free Exercise Clause did not require
exemptions from such laws. Davey clarified that the requirements of neutrality and
general applicability did not extend to cases involving funding of religious activity.99
Unless the controversy could be characterized as a speech case, the government had
substantial freedom to discriminate against religious groups and activities when making funding decisions. Free exercise considerations may have lent implicit support to
petitioners’ free speech claims in cases like Rosenberger, but the Free Exercise Clause
itself was rarely invoked as an explicit basis of the Court’s opinions. The nadir of the
Free Exercise Clause was reached in CLS. The Clause was utterly inadequate to support petitioners’ claims, either on its own or in conjunction with the Free Speech
Clause.100 In short, the Free Exercise Clause may well have become doctrinally otiose.
95

See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
See Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2986 (focusing on whether school’s all-comers
policy violates “CLS’s speech and expressive association rights,” and analyzing “the merits of
the instant dispute . . . with the limited public forum decisions as our guide”).
97
Stanley Fish has also noted the irony that CLS, “a case squarely about religion, [could
not] be directly adjudicated under either of the two prongs of the religion clause.” Stanley Fish,
Is Religion Special?, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR, (July 26, 2010, 5:19 PM), http://opinionator
.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/is-religion-special/?hp.
98
See supra notes 35, 48 and accompanying text.
99
See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.
100
Indeed, the majority does not appear to have seriously entertained the possibility that
CLS presented a hybrid case—i.e., a case in which the combined force of free exercise and free
speech considerations might entitle a petitioner to an exemption from a neutral and generally
applicable law. Cf. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1989) (“The only decisions in
which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable
law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom
of speech and of the press . . . .”).
96
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The next sections discuss some of the implications of this development. I begin
by suggesting that the very fact that the Free Exercise Clause has become so devoid
of meaning is an argument in favor of re-investing it with independent significance.
I then consider what a reinvigorated Clause might look like, and how it might have
informed the Court’s analysis in CLS itself.
II. A REINVIGORATED FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE?
Some scholars have suggested that no constitutional provision should be interpreted
in such a way as to deprive it of independent meaning.101 This argument can only be
stronger with respect to the Free Exercise Clause.102 Textually, the Free Exercise
Clause enjoys a prominent position in the Constitution. It appears in the opening
clauses of the First Amendment, occupying pride of place in the Bill of Rights.103 No
doubt this textual position reflects the prominence of free exercise concerns in the
constitutional debates. Recent scholarship has convincingly argued that “[r]eligious
exercise was among those rights the framers of the First Amendment were most concerned with protecting against interference by the federal government . . . and there is
evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were similarly concerned with
protecting religious exercise against encroachments by state governments . . . .”104
Given this textual and substantive importance of free exercise rights in constitutional
history, “[t]he most defensible reading of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be one that
reads it right out of the Constitution.”105
But the question remains: even if the Clause should have independent meaning,
what kind of meaning should it have? To be sure, several commentators have argued
that something akin to its current meaning actually works reasonably well, and that the
current state of the law is preferable to pre-Smith approaches that privileged religion
over non-religion. These commentators have been especially critical of the idea that
101

See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 73 n.10 (noting that some approaches to constitutional
interpretation “insist that every constitutional provision have some independent meaning”).
102
See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 925, 929–30 & n.27 (2000) (arguing that it “makes more sense to proceed on
the assumption that the Free Exercise Clause means something rather than nothing,” but noting
that “the Supreme Court occasionally interprets constitutional provisions as if they really do
mean virtually nothing”).
103
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
104
Gedicks, supra note 102, at 930. For in-depth analysis of the origins of the Free Exercise
Clause, see Michael W. McConnell, Freedom From Persecution or Protection of the Rights
of Conscience?: A Critique of Justice Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 819 (1998) [hereinafter McConnell, Freedom from Persecution];
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 36; Michael W. McConnell, The Origins
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990)
[hereinafter McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding].
105
Gedicks, supra note 102, at 929–30.
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religious claimants should be entitled to special exemptions from generally-applicable
laws. Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager are among the most prominent of
these critics. In their view, a regime of religious exemptions is both “normatively unjustified and unattractive in its practical implications . . . .”106 They deny that religious
belief and practice are uniquely worthy of constitutional protection, and maintain that
“[w]hat properly motivates constitutional solicitude for religious practices is their distinct vulnerability to discrimination, not their distinct value . . . .”107 Thus, the proper
approach under the Free Exercise Clause is one that provides religion with “protection
against discrimination, not privilege against legitimate governmental concerns.”108
Eisgruber and Sager call this theory of religious freedom “Equal Liberty.”109 As its
name implies, this theory places strong emphasis on equality between believers and
non-believers: it “demands that all persons—whether engaged in religiously inspired
enterprises or not—enjoy rights of free speech, personal autonomy, associative freedom, and private property that, while neither uniquely relevant to religion nor defined
in terms of religion, will allow religious practice to flourish.”110 Religious exemptions
violate this equality norm, and are to be rejected accordingly.111
Frederick Mark Gedicks likewise emphasizes equality considerations in rejecting the idea that the Free Exercise Clause should be read to mandate religious exemptions.112 Indeed, he suggests that those who support exemptions “no longer hold the
high ground,” and notes the difficulty of justifying the pre-Smith approach of “giving
religious practices special constitutional protection that is not afforded to secular activities that appear to be just as morally serious and socially valuable as religion.”113 But
while Gedicks does not believe that the Smith Court erred in denying a uniquely privileged status to religious practice and in eliminating the doctrine of religious exemptions,
he does suggest that the Court may have gone a step too far.114 For while earlier Free
106

Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1248 (1994).
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 33, at 4–5, 51–77.
110
Id. at 52–53.
111
See id. at 54.
112
See Gedicks, supra note 102.
113
Id. at 926–27. Gedicks clarifies that his position is “prudential, not ethical; because a
defense of the religious exemption doctrine is no longer plausible, one must construct other
defenses of religious liberty. . . . This is not to argue that it is wrong to defend religious exemptions, but only that, in the long run, no effective defense is possible.” Id. at 950–51; see
also Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of
Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 557 (1998) (“I emphasize that I am
not urging the abandonment of exemptions on the basis of a normative argument, but rather for
the pragmatic reason that they can no longer be justified with the theoretical resources available
in the late 20th century legal culture.”).
114
Gedicks, supra note 102, at 929.
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Exercise Clause doctrine gave religious belief and practice greater protection than
other fundamental rights like speech and association, current doctrine gives religious
exercise less protection than these other rights.115 Gedicks proposes that this imbalance
be remedied by giving Free Exercise Clause claims the same kind of scrutiny given
to Free Speech and Equal Protection Clause claims—“even when the activity at issue
cannot plausibly be characterized as expression or association for expressive purposes.”116 For example, the Free Exercise Clause should require intermediate scrutiny
of incidental time, place, and manner regulations of religious practice,117 and should
offer direct protection to freedom of religious association.118 Such refinements to existing doctrine would offer protection to religion that is analogous to the protection
afforded to speech, but would avoid the problem of privileging religious commitments
over secular ones.119
While the current state of Free Exercise Clause doctrine has thus been defended
to varying degrees, it has more commonly been subjected to sustained criticism.120
Michael McConnell, for example, has written a series of articles questioning contemporary free exercise jurisprudence on historical grounds.121 One of McConnell’s main
arguments is that the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause may well have
included a right to religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.122 McConnell
is careful not to overstate the strength of this conclusion: for “[e]xemptions were not
common enough to compel the inference that the term ‘free exercise of religion’ necessarily included an enforceable right to exemption, and there was little direct discussion
of the issue.”123 Nevertheless, his reading of the evidence suggests that “the [preSmith] doctrine of free exercise exemptions is more consistent with the original understanding than is a position that leads only to the facial neutrality of legislation.”124
Moreover, McConnell maintains that exemptions should be limited to conduct
motivated by religious belief; they should not be extended to conduct motivated by
115

Id. at 932.
Id. at 934.
117
Id. at 935–38.
118
Id. at 941–44.
119
Id. at 944.
120
See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne
v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 154 (1997) (noting that “the general (though far from unanimous) weight of scholarly opinion has been critical of Smith” and citing examples).
121
See supra note 104; see also René Reyes, Justice Souter’s Religion Clause Jurisprudence:
Judgments of Conscience, 43 CONN. L. REV. 303, 315, 317–18 (2010) (discussing McConnell’s
views on freedom of conscience under the Free Exercise Clause).
122
McConnell, Origins and Historical Understandings, supra note 104, at 1511.
123
Id. at 1512.
124
Id. For a contrary reading of the historical record, see Philip Hamburger, A Constitutional
Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916
(1992) (“In fact, late eighteenth-century Americans tended to assume that the Free Exercise
Clause did not provide a constitutional right of religious exemption from civil laws.”).
116
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secular moral commitments.125 McConnell marshals a number of arguments in support
of this position. As a matter of constitutional history, he notes that the First Congress
considered and rejected a draft of the First Amendment that would have protected
“rights of conscience” in general, choosing to insert language protecting “the free exercise of religion” in particular instead.126 As a matter of intellectual history, he further
notes that in the founding era, conflicts between religious duty and secular law “were
conceived not as a clash between the judgment of the individual and the state, but
as a conflict between earthly and spiritual sovereigns.”127 In other words, religious
duties were understood to be duties to God—a higher and prior source of authority
than the state or the self.128 Consequently, the Free Exercise Clause should be read
to “accord[ ] a special, protected status to religious conscience not because religious
judgments are better, truer, or more likely to be moral than nonreligious judgments,
but because the obligations entailed by religion transcend the individual and are
outside the individual’s control.”129 Thus, far from sharing Eisgruber’s and Sager’s
view that religion should never be a constitutionally privileged sphere of activity,130
McConnell insists “that ‘singling out religion’ for special constitutional protection
is fully consistent with our constitutional tradition.”131
Douglas Laycock has been another forceful and consistent critic of recent developments in free exercise jurisprudence.132 He was one of the first to extensively analyze
and critique the Smith decision—a decision he described as “dubious or demonstrably wrong as a matter of text, precedent, and original intent . . . .”133 Laycock cites
McConnell’s work in support of his own arguments, and agrees with McConnell that
religion is special in a constitutionally relevant sense and therefore entitled to special
exemptions from otherwise valid laws.134 In his view, one of the chief flaws of the
Smith opinion was its failure to recognize these special attributes of religious practice:
[I]n applying the equal protection rule, the unique features of religion do not require that religion be distinguished from any other
human activity. In the Court’s view, religious use of peyote . . .
is no more protected than its recreational use. A soldier who
125

McConnell, Origins and Historical Understandings, supra note 104, at 1491–92.
Id. at 1488–1500.
127
Id. at 1496.
128
Id. at 1497.
129
Id.
130
See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text.
131
Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
1, 3 (2000).
132
See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 36.
133
Id. at 3.
134
Id. at 16 & n.69 (arguing that the text of the Religion Clauses and the debates that
surrounded their adoption “presuppose that religion is in some way a special human activity,
requiring special rules applicable only to it”).
126
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believes he must cover his head before an omnipresent God is
constitutionally indistinguishable from a soldier who wants to
wear a Budweiser gimmie cap.135
Laycock refers to this equality-based approach to the Free Exercise Clause as
formal neutrality, which he distinguishes from substantive neutrality.136 Whereas a
formally neutral law treats religious activity just like any other activity, a substantively neutral law does something more: “it neither encourages nor discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance.”137
In Smith, substantive neutrality would have supported an exemption for the religious
use of peyote—for the state’s ban clearly discouraged a religious practice, while an
exemption would not likely have encouraged anyone to adopt the Native American religion.138 Similarly, in Davey, substantive neutrality would have required the state to
finance the petitioner’s theology major—for the ban on funding discouraged religious
practice by effectively paying students not to pursue devotional studies.139 Laycock
acknowledges that substantive neutrality has never been adopted by the Court as the
governing standard for Religion Clause cases,140 but maintains that it would be the
approach that often best serves religious freedom.141
How is one to resolve this debate over the proper meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause? On the one hand, scholars like Eisgruber, Sager, and Gedicks might allow for
some expanded protection of religious activity, but insist that special exemptions for
religiously-motivated conduct are normatively indefensible and should not be constitutionally mandated. On the other hand, commentators like McConnell and Laycock
maintain that religion is qualitatively different from other forms of activity and should
be afforded special exemptions in order to protect religious conscience and to promote
substantive neutrality. If these are the only two options, then we are left with seemingly irreconcilable understandings of religion and its place under the Free Exercise
Clause. Either religion is special, or it is not. Either religious believers are entitled
to exemptions from generally applicable laws, or nobody is. This apparent duality is
implicit in Gedicks’s formulation of the challenge faced by those seeking to promote
religious liberty: “How, then might religious liberty be protected, if not by exemptions?
135

Id. at 11.
Id. at 10.
137
Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 54–55
(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
138
See Laycock, supra note 36, at 7 (discussing unpleasant aspects of peyote consumption
that make it an unlikely choice for insincere or recreational use).
139
Laycock, supra note 67, at 160.
140
Laycock, supra note 137, at 53 (“Of all the thousands of judges in America, only Justice
Souter has ever cited my account of substantive neutrality in reported opinions, and of course
he did it only when it suited his purposes.”).
141
See Laycock, supra note 67, at 156.
136
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More precisely, how can those concerned about religious liberty argue for a meaningful level of constitutional protection for religious exercise without elevating it above
comparable activities motivated by secular morality?”142
Yet there may be a third way. My own suggestion is that the Free Exercise Clause
should recognize that religious beliefs are special—but not more special than fundamental moral commitments that spring from secular foundations. This understanding
in turn suggests that the Free Exercise Clause should be read to require some exemptions from generally applicable laws—but these exemptions should protect religious
and secular claimants to the same degree. My proposal thus draws upon some of the
strongest arguments offered by both sides in the debate over the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause. It conceives of free exercise as a substantive right rather than a mere
equality right, and affords claimants greater freedom to act in accordance with their
deeply held beliefs.143 But it also ensures that this is a right of equal liberty that does
not give religious claimants special benefits that it denies to others.144 Gedicks notes
that more limited versions of my suggestion have occasionally appeared in the literature,145 and argues that the impulse to include secular claims along with religious ones
implicitly concedes the weakness of the entire exemptions argument.146 I argue that the
opposite is true: by treating religious and secular claims of conscience as presumptively
valuable, my proposed understanding of the Free Exercise Clause is strengthened by
its simultaneous commitment to both liberty and equality.
There are, of course, a number of objections that might be raised against the reinvigorated Free Exercise Clause that I am proposing. One objection is textual: the
First Amendment speaks of religion rather than conscience, and this was apparently
the result of a deliberate drafting choice made by the First Congress.147 But recent
scholarship has convincingly demonstrated that protecting liberty of conscience was
indeed among the chief purposes of the Religion Clauses, and there is disagreement
among scholars as to how much significance should be attached to the omission of
the term “conscience” from the final version of the text. Michael McConnell concludes that the omission indicates that secular claims of conscience were to be excluded from the protective ambit of the Clauses,148 but Noah Feldman maintains that
142

Gedicks, supra note 102, at 927.
See Laycock, supra note 36, at 13 (“Most directly, the Free Exercise Clause creates a
substantive right, and the Court has reduced it to a mere equality right. . . . Congress may
prohibit many things, but it may not prohibit religious exercise. On its face, this is a substantive
entitlement, and not merely a pledge of non-discrimination.”).
144
See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 33, at 52 (“Equal Liberty insists that . . . we have
no constitutional reason to treat religion as deserving special benefits . . . .”).
145
Gedicks, supra note 113, at 571–72.
146
Id.
147
See McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 104, at 1488–1500;
see also Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 346, 398–405 (2002) (analyzing the drafts and debates of the Religion Clauses).
148
McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 104, at 1491–93.
143
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separate mention of “conscience” was simply unnecessary once free exercise and nonestablishment had already been guaranteed.149 Furthermore, the mere fact that my proposed reading of the Free Exercise Clause may be broader than the text or its original
meaning should hardly constitute a fatal objection. Contemporary interpretations of
the Constitution often go beyond the plain reading and original understandings of
the relevant text,150 and are sometimes even said to “mark the progress of a maturing
society.”151 A broadly reinvigorated Free Exercise Clause would simply be consistent with this well-established interpretive approach.
A stronger objection is that the breadth of my proposed understanding would
render the Free Exercise Clause too unwieldy. As Professor McConnell has argued,
the Clause cannot possibly extend to “everything and anything”152—particularly if
every restriction on conscientious activity must be justified by a compelling government interest. However, the fact that the Free Exercise Clause might include secular
claims of conscience does not mean that it would treat all claims equally; the term
“conscience” itself excludes from protection conduct that results from mere personal
preference as opposed to deeply held moral commitments. Nor does my proposal necessarily require the Court to return to the compelling interest standard. Most commentators agree that even before Smith, the compelling interest standard was unworkable
and frequently avoided in free exercise cases.153 Courts could therefore adopt a lower
149

Feldman, supra note 147, at 404 (“The reasons for the Senate’s omission of the reference to conscience are not clear. What is certain is that the notion of liberty of conscience
was not being abandoned; rather, protection of free exercise and a ban on establishment, taken
together, were thought to cover all the ground required to protect the liberty of conscience.”
(citation omitted)).
150
Examples include interpretations of the Free Speech Clause that protect expressive conduct or the transmission of sexually explicit material over the Internet. See Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (protecting transmission of material that is “indecent but not obscene”);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (protecting flag burning as expressive conduct); see
also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It Matter What Religion Is?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807, 822, 833 (noting that while the First Amendment “singles out
‘speech’ and ‘press’ for special protections . . . the Court has had no trouble generalizing those
protections to encompass other forms of expression” and arguing that their own “approach
to the Religion Clauses has much in common with familiar features of free speech doctrine”).
151
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on those who committed crimes before the
age of eighteen, and noting the need to consider “evolving standards of decency” to determine
whether punishment is cruel and unusual).
152
McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 104, at 1493.
153
Eisgruber and Sager put it best: “Elsewhere, the compelling state interest test was ‘strict
in theory but fatal in fact’; in religious liberty cases, it was strict in theory but feeble in fact.”
EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 33, at 43; see also 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND
THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 215 (2006) (“Perhaps the courts have not
been generous enough; but we need frank recognition that a compelling interest test for exemptions cases neither has been, nor should be, as stringent as the test is in other contexts.”);
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 36, at 1127 (“In an area of law where a
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but nonetheless meaningful standard of review, such as a “significant interest”154 or
“peace and safety” test.155
I do not mean to suggest that administrative challenges would not remain. Courts
would be called upon to evaluate the sincerity of beliefs, many of which could be idiosyncratic and difficult to weigh against government interests in regulation. Martha
Nussbaum alludes to such concerns in her own recent examination of the Religion
Clauses.156 While Nussbaum generally supports a broad and equal right to exemptions
and accommodations, she is also swayed by “pragmatic and historical arguments for
giving religion a special place.”157 She therefore is willing to give some preference to
religious claimants, and acknowledges that extending equal protection to non-religious
claimants may be limited by the demands of “administrability.”158 Kent Greenawalt
likewise supports equal treatment of religious and nonreligious claimants in general—
but likewise notes that administrative concerns may occasionally override considerations of equality.159
However, there are reasons to believe that such administrative challenges would
not be insurmountable. For one, free exercise doctrine prior to Smith required courts
to engage in this very sort of analysis: they would evaluate the sincerity of beliefs and
the weight of burdens on religious practice, and compare them to the government’s
asserted interest in regulating the affected conduct.160 For another, even after Smith,
courts continue to make these kinds of judgments when deciding cases brought against
the federal government under RFRA.161 Religious claims can be highly individualized,
genuine ‘compelling interest’ test has been applied, intentional discrimination against a racial
minority, no such interest has been discovered in almost half a century. Even the Justices
committed to the doctrine of free exercise exemptions have in fact applied a far more relaxed
standard to these cases, and they were correct to do so.”).
154
See GREENAWALT, supra note 153, at 215.
155
See McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 36, at 1128.
156
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 36.
157
Id. at 173; see also René Reyes, Conscience Reexamined: Liberty, Equality, and the
Legacy of Roger Williams, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 8–9 (2008) (discussing Nussbaum’s
treatment of non-religious claims of conscience).
158
NUSSBAUM, supra note 36, at 173.
159
See Kent Greenawalt, Diverse Perspectives and the Religion Clauses: An Examination
of Justifications and Qualifying Beliefs, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1433, 1472 (1999) (arguing
that “it is not so easy to conceptualize a nonreligious objection to schooling or Saturday work
that is quite like one that might be based on religious understanding” and that “[t]he law may
appropriately require that religious belief or practice be a condition for a valid claim to
exemption from such rules . . . .”).
160
See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
907 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The distinction between questions of centrality and
questions of sincerity and burden is admittedly fine, but it is one that is an established part of
our free exercise doctrine . . . and one that courts are capable of making.” (internal citations
omitted)).
161
Recall that while RFRA was struck down as applied to the states, it remains in force as
applied to the federal government. See supra note 37; see also the Religious Land Use and
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but the mere fact that a particular belief or practice is not widely shared and thus more
difficult to evaluate does not render it ineligible for protection.162 The same should
hold true for idiosyncratic secular claims of conscience.
Having now traced the fading of free exercise doctrine from redundancy into irrelevance, and having offered an argument in favor of reinvigorating the Free Exercise
Clause with independent constitutional meaning, this Article will now return to where
it began: to the facts and holding of CLS. Specifically, the next section will consider
whether and to what extent a reinvigorated Free Exercise Clause might have affected
the analysis and outcome of the case.
III. THE REINVIGORATED FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND CHRISTIAN LEGAL
SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ
The version of the reinvigorated Free Exercise Clause sketched above proposes
that conscientious claimants—religious or otherwise—should be entitled to exemptions
from generally applicable laws, unless the government has a sufficiently weighty reason
for denying the exemption. The chief concerns of this version of the Clause are twofold: protecting liberty and respecting equality. Both concerns should therefore factor
into the analysis of any claims brought under the Free Exercise Clause.
The petitioner in CLS claimed that it was being denied both liberty and equality.163
These claims were primarily advanced under the doctrinal rubrics of freedom of speech
and association,164 but readily lend themselves to analysis under the rubric of a reinvigorated Free Exercise Clause. With respect to liberty, CLS argued that it was being
denied the right to participate in the life of the law school community because it required voting members and officers to sign a statement of faith.165 The right to limit
membership in this way was said to be essential to the group’s identity and message.166
As petitioner framed it: “To require a religious group like CLS to admit nonbelievers
is a severe burden on its freedom of association,” and “[t]he same is true of requiring
CLS to accept leaders who do not follow its moral teachings.”167 CLS also claimed
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (making the compelling
interest test applicable to claims for religious accommodation brought by state and federal
prisoners, and to challenges to certain land use regulations brought by religious organizations). It is also worth noting that many states apply equivalent standards to free exercise claims
brought under state law. See Laycock, supra note 67, at 212 (“In all, more than half the states
appear to have adopted some version of the Sherbert-Yoder test.”).
162
See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (fact that petitioner’s religious beliefs
were not widely shared among other members of his faith did not defeat Free Exercise Clause
claim).
163
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 24, at 23, 30–36.
164
Id. at 21–36.
165
Id. at 5, 37.
166
Id. at 28–34.
167
Id. at 32.
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that the denial of RSO status placed a significant burden on its liberty rights, asserting
that “[t]he ability to participate in a campus forum on equal terms with other groups is
the very lifeblood of a student organization.”168 This burden took the form of limited
access to campus facilities for meetings and events, and the unavailability of certain
campus-wide communication networks.169
As to equality, CLS emphasized that it was the only group ever to be denied RSO
status at Hastings.170 It argued that other identity groups had long been permitted to
place conditions on membership,171 and that the school’s written nondiscrimination
policy prohibited such conditions only if they were religious in nature.172 And while
CLS conceded that Hastings’s policy had been interpreted to require RSOs to accept
“all comers,” it also argued that this interpretation was not invoked until litigation was
well under way and should therefore not govern the Court’s analysis.173
Finally, petitioner maintained that Hastings had no compelling—or even reasonable—interest in enforcing its nondiscrimination policy against CLS.174 Whereas the
state undeniably has an interest in eliminating discrimination on the basis of race and
sex, CLS argued that “government has no such interest . . . in eliminating the desire
or ability of co-religionists to flock together.”175 CLS further suggested that the allcomers policy was “frankly absurd,” insofar as it would undermine the ability of groups
to form and express diverse viewpoints—one of the very purposes for which the RSO
program was created.176
CLS thus arguably could have established a prima facie case for an exemption
under a reinvigorated Free Exercise Clause. So should the group have prevailed in its
case against Hastings? I am inclined to think not. Admittedly, this inclination may
seem unexpected—especially in light of the arguments and observations about religious
liberty that I have made elsewhere in this Article. But I suggest that my inclination is
justified both by the facts of the case and by the underlying values of the reinvigorated
Free Exercise Clause.
168

Id. at 23; see also Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3007 (2010) (Alito,
J., dissenting) (“As CLS notes, ‘[t]o university students, the campus is their world. The right
to meet on campus and use campus channels of communication is at least as important to university students as the right to gather on the town square and use local communication forums
is to the citizen.’” (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13, Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct.
2971 (No. 08-1371)).
169
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 24, at 23–25.
170
Id. at 4 (“Only one group has ever been denied the right to participate in the forum:
Petitioner Christian Legal Society.”); see also Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 3000 (Alito,
J., dissenting) (“Hastings currently has more than 60 registered groups and, in all its history,
has denied registration to exactly one: the Christian Legal Society.”).
171
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 24, at 12–14.
172
Id. at 36–37.
173
Id. at 47–48.
174
Id. at 42–47.
175
Id. at 43.
176
Id. at 49–50.
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Factually, the case appears to have involved a lighter burden on religious liberty
than CLS’s brief might imply. Most importantly, there is no indication that Hastings
sought to prohibit the group from existing on campus or to starve it of the resources
that it would need in order to survive. The Court’s majority opinion emphasizes that
Hastings “offered CLS access to school facilities to conduct meetings and the use of
chalkboards and generally available bulletin boards to advertise events”177—a point
that CLS acknowledges in its brief.178 Nor did Hastings condition this access on any
change in CLS’s membership policies; the group was permitted to make limited use
of school resources even while continuing to require its members to sign the statement
of faith.179 The opinion also notes that in the year since Hastings denied CLS recognition, the number of students attending its meetings actually doubled.180 The burdens
on religious liberty therefore appear to have been incidental and of limited severity.
This does not mean that CLS suffered no burdens whatsoever. By refusing to
abandon its membership requirements, CLS incurred the burden of ineligibility for
funding opportunities that accompanied RSO status.181 The Court indicated that the
funding issue was potentially significant, noting that the financial assistance given to
RSOs was drawn from mandatory student fees, and that “the all-comers policy ensures
that no Hastings student is forced to fund a group that would reject her as a member.”182
But for its part, CLS did not place much emphasis on the availability of financial assistance. Petitioner described funding as merely “one of the incidents of RSO status at
Hastings,”183 and focused much more attention on access to campus life in general. In
his dissent, Justice Alito agreed that “funding plays a very small role in this case.”184
Thus, it does not appear that the financial aspects of the case strongly favored CLS,
nor that the unavailability of funding was a particularly severe burden imposed on
the group.
It also does not appear that equality considerations strongly favored CLS. At least
on the record before the Court, this was not a case like Lukumi or Davey in which
religion was singled out for unfavorable treatment. Early in the litigation, CLS and
Hastings jointly stipulated that the nondiscrimination policy was interpreted to require
all student groups to accept all comers; it was accordingly not open to CLS to argue
177

Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2871, 2991 (2010).
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 24, at 25.
179
Id. at 11–12.
180
Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2991.
181
Interestingly, Hastings suggested that CLS might have been able to get around even this
burden by “associating within the RSO program consistent with that program’s rules, and also
outside that program in any manner they wish.” Brief of Respondents, supra note 25, at 40.
182
Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2989.
183
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 24, at 56; see also Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note
168, at 26 (“This case has never focused on money. . . . We suspect Respondents obsess about
funding because it is so hard to defend excluding CLS from meeting places and communications media.”).
184
Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 3007 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Vischer, supra
note 10 (criticizing majority opinion and insisting that “the case was never about money”).
178
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on appeal that the policy applied only to religious groups.185 Nor was this a situation
in which exemptions to the policy were available to some groups but not to others.
Though CLS appears to have been the only group ever to be denied RSO status, it
also appears to have been the only group ever to seek an exemption from Hastings’s
nondiscrimination policy.186 Notwithstanding this evidence of even-handedness,
CLS argued that the all-comers policy was pretextual and selectively enforced—but
those arguments had not been addressed below and the Court accordingly declined to
entertain them.187
Turning to the other side of the ledger, the government’s interests in enforcing the
nondiscrimination policy against CLS were at least reasonable and arguably significant. The Court considered several such interests, and evaluated each with deference
to Hastings’s authority to make educational decisions.188 These included the school’s
interests in ensuring that leadership opportunities in RSOs were open to all students;189
in administering its nondiscrimination policy without inquiring into the motives behind exclusionary membership decisions;190 in promoting tolerance, cooperation, and
conflict resolution by bringing together students with diverse beliefs;191 and in conveying its decision not “to subsidize with public monies and benefits conduct of which the
people of California disapprove.”192
On balance, then, CLS’s interests in liberty and equality would not seem to justify
an exemption even under a reinvigorated Free Exercise Clause. But does this conclusion suggest that the heightened standard of review that I propose in theory would
simply be evaded in practice, much like the compelling interest standard that came
before it? And does it undermine the very case I have been making for a reinvigorated
doctrine of religious liberty? This Article began by arguing that Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez was unambiguously about religion, and that the most notable
185

Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 (“In light of the joint stipulation, both the
District Court and the Ninth Circuit trained their attention on the constitutionality of the allcomers requirement . . . . We reject CLS’s unseemly attempt to escape from the stipulation and
shift its target to Hastings’ policy as written.”); see also Amar, supra note 18 (emphasizing
importance of concession to outcome of the litigation).
186
Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2980 (“From Hastings’ adoption of its Nondiscrimination Policy in 1990 until the events stirring this litigation, no student organization at
Hastings . . . ever sought an exemption from the Policy.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
187
Id. at 2995 (leaving the pretext argument for consideration on remand “if, and to the
extent, it is preserved”).
188
See id. at 2989 (“Schools, we have emphasized, enjoy ‘a significant measure of authority
over the type of officially recognized activities in which their students participate.’” (citing
Board of Ed. of Westside Comm. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 240 (1990))); see also Amar,
supra note 18 (“[D]eference by the Court to educational judgments matters a great deal in
resolving constitutional cases against universities.”).
189
Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2989.
190
Id. at 2990.
191
Id.
192
Id.
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aspect of the case was its absence of engagement with the Free Exercise Clause. Yet
I have just concluded that such engagement should not have changed the outcome of
the case. Does this imply that the promise of a reinvigorated Free Exercise Clause
would prove illusory after all?
Once again, I am inclined to think not. Indeed, far from exposing its vice, the
foregoing application of the reinvigorated Free Exercise Clause to CLS confirms its
virtue. For the version of the Free Exercise Clause that I have proposed is not a blunt
instrument. The fact that a law is neutral and generally applicable does not necessarily
mean that it will pass muster; but nor does the fact that it burdens conscientious
activity necessarily mean that it will fail. Rather, courts must carefully attend to the
details of the case and consider how they inform the Clause’s twin concerns with
liberty and equality. In CLS, these considerations of liberty and equality—at least on
the facts before the Court—did not strongly support a result for the petitioner. Thus,
one of the ironies of CLS is that while the facts of the case cried out for analysis under
the Free Exercise Clause, the ultimate result of that analysis was to demonstrate the
insufficiency of petitioner’s claims.
CONCLUSION
This Article has used Christian Legal Society v. Martinez as a point of departure
for analyzing the current state of free exercise doctrine. I have argued that the conspicuous absence of free exercise analysis from the case highlights the extent to which
the Free Exercise Clause has faded from constitutional significance, and have traced
the course of this development through the Court’s recent First Amendment jurisprudence. I have also suggested that the fact that the Free Exercise Clause has become
so doctrinally otiose is itself an argument for reinvesting the Clause with independent
meaning. But what kind of meaning should it have? Unlike commentators who have
reasoned that free exercise doctrine must either treat all citizens equally or give religious believers special privileges, I have outlined an approach to the Free Exercise
Clause that seeks to accomplish both. Specifically, I have proposed that the Clause
be reinvigorated to provide some exemptions from generally-applicable laws for conscientious objectors—but that these exemptions must be available to religious and
secular claimants on an equal footing.
To illustrate how my proposal might operate in practice, I have also applied the
reinvigorated Free Exercise Clause to Christian Legal Society v. Martinez itself. The
fact that application of the Clause would not have changed the outcome does not indicate that my version of the Clause would be without effect; it rather demonstrates that
my approach is sufficiently nuanced and flexible to distinguish between stronger and
weaker claims for exemptions. While CLS proved to involve claims of the latter sort,
future cases may well present more compelling claims for relief. A reinvigorated Free
Exercise Clause has the potential to vindicate those claims, and to do so in service to
both liberty and equality.
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ABSTRACT
Proposals to subject welfare recipients to periodic drug testing have emerged over
the last three years as a significant legislative trend across the United States. Since
2007, over half of the states have considered bills requiring aid recipients to submit to
invasive extraction procedures as an ongoing condition of public assistance. The vast
majority of the legislation imposes testing without regard to suspected drug use, reflecting the implicit assumption that the poor are inherently predisposed to culpable
conduct and thus may be subject to class-based intrusions that would be inarguably
impermissible if inflicted on the less destitute. These proposals are gaining increasingly substantial political support, suggesting that the enactment of drug testing legislation is now a real and immediate prospect.
Given the gravity of the suspicionless searches at issue, the proposals raise serious
concerns under conventional Fourth Amendment doctrine. Nevertheless, there is considerable doubt whether the federal courts will accede to that authority and prohibit
the proposed intrusions, given the long tradition of relegating the privacy rights of
the poor to inferior and indifferent enforcement. This Article explores these legislative developments and the constitutional context within which they arise, and makes
the case for using the impending battle over suspicionless drug testing to reclaim for
the indigent the full reach of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy right.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. POVERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE CONSTITUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Declared Constitution and the Irrelevance of Class . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Veiled Constitution and Class Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Bias Embedded in the Privacy Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Bias Enforced on the Privacy Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Rationalizing Bias: Poverty as a Proxy for Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. POVERTY, PRIVACY, AND SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING . . . . . . . . . . . . .

752
756
756
761
763
765
771
774

* Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire School of Law. Many thanks to my
research assistants Saurabh Vishnubhakat and Karinne Brobst for their invaluable assistance,
to Dana Remus for her thoughtful comments, and to Dean John Broderick and Associate Deans
Susan Richey and John Orcutt of the UNH School of Law for their ongoing support. Finally,
thanks most of all to Paris Awalt for her unfailing encouragement, friendship, and insight.

751

752

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:751

A. Prelude: Federal Welfare Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The Premise of the Addicted Poor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. The Premise of State Dominion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. The Irrelevance of Efficacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Initial Response of the States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. The Legislative Groundswell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The Elimination of Individualized Suspicion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. The Attributes of Testing: Breadth, Process, and Consequences . .
D. Two Visions of a Constitutional Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Bodily Privacy: A Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Principled Adjudication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Subconstitutional Adjudication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

775
775
778
779
781
783
784
786
790
791
794
796
803

We are sending the absolutely wrong signal to the next generation
about what is needed to get ahead in life if we don’t threaten benefits
for recipients who won’t even lift a finger to help themselves or their
children. . . . I am hearing from people who accept random drug
testing as a condition for their jobs. They see no problem with having
people on public assistance doing the same.1
INTRODUCTION
In 1275, an English woman named Alice Crese failed to pay Richard of Ely for
two shillings’ worth of bread.2 Richard brought her before the Court of St. Ives Fair,
which ordered that she “pledge her body” for the debt.3 Seven centuries later, the poor
still face the prospect of pledging their bodies for the debt of bread. Legislatures across
the United States are considering scores of drug testing proposals that will require the
indigent to periodically submit to invasive extraction procedures as an ongoing condition of public assistance.4 The majority of the proposals require no suspicion of
drug use whatsoever; they rest instead on the implicit notion that the poor are intrinsically predisposed to immoral conduct and that, once indebted, their bodies are the
domain of the state in any event.5 Not surprisingly, the proposals face nearly insurmountable difficulties under conventional Fourth Amendment authority. Perhaps more
surprisingly, there is great uncertainty whether the federal courts will accede to that
1

Andre Bauer, Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina, Culture of Dependency Must be
Broken, TIMES AND DEMOCRAT (Orangeburg, S.C.), Feb. 13, 2010, available at http://www
.thetandd.com/news/opinion/columnists/article_6b97a743-e3f6-5747-874e-0026fe6c3674.html.
2
Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval
‘Law Merchant,’ 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685, 704 n.54 (2006).
3
Id.
4
See infra Part II.C.
5
See infra Part II.A.1 & II.A.2.
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authority and prohibit the proposed search practices, given a series of recent decisions
that have upheld related privacy intrusions in defiance of apparently controlling law.6
This Article explores these legislative developments and the constitutional context
within which they arise, and makes the case for using the impending battle to reclaim
for the indigent the full reach of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy right.
The poor as a class live largely beyond the Constitution. Unlike the indigent in
many comparable constitutional states, impoverished Americans enjoy no positive
socioeconomic rights nor any appreciable protection against discriminatory state action.
Recent scholarship has characterized this absence of rights recognition as the “deconstitutionalization” of American poverty law7—a description that the United States
Supreme Court itself would likely embrace.8 The rhetoric of American constitutionalism, however, holds fast to the assertion that rights of general applicability in fact
apply equally and without regard to socioeconomic status. The law may be indifferent
to the poor, we are told, but it certainly bears them no ill will.9 The claim is demonstrably false. In several contexts—the Fourth Amendment prominent among them—
American law effectively if disguisedly denies the indigent the full force of generally
applicable constitutional guarantees, thus establishing a dual system of rights enforcement that relegates the poor to subconstitutional status.10 Beyond declarations of
formal neutrality, this veiled truth lies at the core of the nation’s constitutional relationship with the dispossessed: the enforced Constitution is not only blind to poverty
but frequently antagonistic to it as well.11 Thus the poor live not merely beyond the
Constitution but also beneath it, at once deconstitutionalized and subconstitutionalized
in relation to the law.
This Article considers the subconstitutional dimension of American poverty law
in relation to the Fourth Amendment’s privacy right. Privacy intrusions that are plainly
impermissible in analogous contexts are regularly imposed on the poor and upheld by
the courts based on the improbable recharacterization of otherwise applicable doctrine
or, as likely, its disregard. The willingness of the judiciary to suspend or dilute core
6

See infra Parts I.B.2 & II.D.2.
See, e.g., Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law,
Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 629–36 (2008) [hereinafter
No Scrutiny].
8
See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (“[T]he intractable economic,
social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are
not the business of this Court.”).
9
See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956) (noting aspiration to “[p]rovid[e]
equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike”); cf. Stephen Loffredo, Poverty,
Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1358–59 (1993) (“[E]quality
of formal rights are to be scrupulously maintained . . . but the immeasurably greater political
inequalities that flow from private wealth through less visible and more ad hoc processes
may not be disturbed.”).
10
See, e.g., Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional
Status and the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355 (2010).
11
See infra Part I.B.
7

754

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:751

constitutional protections in this respect is consistent with the longstanding conception of the poor as inherently prone to and deserving of their predicament. Imagined
as criminally predisposed and morally bereft, the indigent constitute a presumptively
culpable class and, accordingly, face status-based intrusions that would be otherwise
irreconcilable with the Fourth Amendment’s emphasis on individualized suspicion.12
This biased and bifurcated rights analysis is sufficiently well-established to merit its
recent characterization as a “poverty exception” to the Fourth Amendment.13
The next chapter of this constitutional assault is now being written in legislatures
across the country. Over the last three years, over half of the states have considered
legislation linking the receipt of public assistance to mandatory screening for drug
use.14 Some of the proposals are relatively innocuous, involving written questionnaires and recommended treatment protocols for individuals whose responses suggest
the possibility of drug dependence.15 Most of the proposals, however, are far more
severe, often requiring that every recipient submit to the invasive extraction of bodily
fluids and barring assistance to anyone testing positive.16 Recently, members of the
United States Congress have joined the cavalcade and introduced legislation requiring states that administer federal welfare funds to conduct blanket drug testing of all
program participants.17
To date, only one state has implemented a suspicionless and invasive testing requirement, although several others have enacted less onerous variants.18 In 1999,
Michigan passed a mandatory testing law that conditioned public assistance for every
adult recipient on a clean urinalysis report.19 The statute was challenged immediately
and struck down by a federal district judge, who was then reversed by a three-judge
panel of the Sixth Circuit.20 The full circuit subsequently reheard the matter en banc
and produced a perfectly ambiguous resolution: the court divided equally on the
question, with six judges voting to uphold the testing requirement and six voting to
12

See infra Part I.B.3.
Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV.
391 (2003); cf. ACLU Challenges Invasive Home Searches Of Welfare Recipients in San Diego
Area, ACLU, July 24, 2000, http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclu-challenges-inva
sive-home-searches-welfare-recipients-san-diego-area (“There is no poverty exception to the
Fourth Amendment . . . . No one should be forced to waive her constitutional rights and submit
to an unannounced, personally humiliating, and suspicionless search of her home just because
she is in need of public assistance.”).
14
See infra Part II.C.
15
See infra notes 287–88 and accompanying text.
16
See infra Part II.C.1 and II.C.2.
17
See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
18
See infra Part II.B.
19
Pub. Act No. 17, 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 49–50 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS §
400.57l (2009)).
20
Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d, 309 F.3d 330
(6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en
banc), aff’d by an equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
13
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strike it down, thus reinstating the lower court’s injunction but failing to clarify the
constitutional question in any respect.21
Not surprisingly, the evenly divided outcome has been taken not as a repudiation
of such extraordinarily overreaching proposals but as an encouraging sign that the
federal courts may well uphold such intrusions.22 In the years since the conclusion of
the Michigan case, legislatures across the country have considered scores of bills proposing testing requirements of equal or harsher application.23 The proposals have
garnered ever-increasing and, recently, quite substantial support.24 It thus appears that
other states may soon follow Michigan’s lead and require the federal courts to finally
resolve the permissibility of blanket drug testing as a condition of public assistance.
Based on the judiciary’s approach to other seemingly impermissible intrusions upon
the privacy of the poor, as well as the divided resolution in the Michigan litigation, the
prospects of vindicating the constitutional rights of aid recipients is uncertain at best.
The Article is divided into two parts. Part One provides a brief overview of the
relationship of the poor to the United States Constitution, describing both the overt
exclusion of socioeconomic class from constitutional recognition and the veiled
subordination of the poor with respect to the enforcement of generally applicable
constitutional rights. The primary focus of the discussion is an elaboration of the
subconstitutional characteristic of poverty law in the specific context of the Fourth
Amendment’s right to privacy, which sets the stage for the emerging controversy
over the blanket drug testing of welfare recipients.
Part Two turns to the prospect of invasive drug testing as a condition of public
assistance and presents the results of a national survey of related legislation over the
last three years. As the survey reveals, bills with increasingly harsh provisions are
being introduced in greater numbers each year and proceeding further through the
legislative process, suggesting that the ultimate enactment of drug testing legislation
may soon occur. Considering the absence of any data to suggest that the incidence
of drug abuse among the poor is appreciably greater than in the general population,
coupled with the harsh and disparaging rhetoric surrounding many of the current
legislative proposals, this emerging political groundswell evidently seeks to vindicate
little more than the familiar impulse to stigmatize and stereotype the impoverished.
In conclusion, Part Two contrasts the profound constitutional deficiencies of the
harshest of these proposals under conventional doctrine with the irreconcilable approach
of recent decisions sanctioning equally severe privacy intrusions upon the poor. When
21

Marchwinski v. Howard, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
See, e.g., Allan Greenblatt, Should Welfare Recipients Get Drug Testing?, NPR (Mar.
31, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125387528 (“[The sponsor
of drug testing legislation in Kansas] thinks the constitutionality of the drug-testing regime
is itself ‘definitely worth testing.’ The Michigan case was decided by a tied vote, which [the
sponsor] believes is ‘hardly a definite decision against states’ rights.’”).
23
See infra Part II.C.
24
See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
22
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the time comes for the federal courts to finally resolve the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing proposals, these two lines of authority will present the judiciary
with a clear and defining choice: either to reset the relationship of our nation’s poor
to the promise of equal justice, or to betray again the integrity of constitutional adjudication itself.
I. POVERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE CONSTITUTION
The current debate over the drug testing of welfare recipients proceeds in the
shadow of a substantial “if somewhat improvised and largely impoverished”25 body
of constitutional authority addressing the rights of the American poor. It is a familiar
refrain that the jurisprudence accounts for class in a manner that unambiguously disfavors the indigent.26 This general proposition in turn reflects at least three interrelated
but distinct doctrinal themes. First, as a matter of express constitutional policy, the
American poor enjoy no positive rights to socioeconomic security, irrespective of
the magnitude of the deprivation at issue.27 Second, and also as a matter of express
doctrine, the American poor receive no special solicitude when defending against discriminatory state action and thus may be subject to virtually any burden that does not
violate otherwise applicable constitutional constraints.28 Finally, with respect to the
enforcement of generally applicable constraints, American law implicitly differentiates
on the basis of class by diluting the poor’s exercise of rights that purport to apply without regard to socioeconomic status.29 Taken together, these interrelated processes—the
express denial of positive socioeconomic rights, the express denial of protected status,
and the implicit dilution of generally applicable rights—render much of the Constitution
irrelevant at best, and hostile at worst, to the American poor. Nowhere is that theme
more powerfully evident than with respect to the Fourth Amendment’s privacy right.
A. The Declared Constitution and the Irrelevance of Class
In significant contrast to the basic law of most comparable nations, the United
States Constitution treats socioeconomic status as formally irrelevant in almost all
respects.30 This approach has been characterized as the “deconstitutionalization” of
25

Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110 (2009).
26
See, e.g., id., passim; Loffredo, supra note 9, at 1305–13; Nice, No Scrutiny, supra note
7, at 629–36; James G. Wilson, Reconstructing Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to
Assist Impoverished Children, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 391, 402–15 (1990).
27
See infra Part I.A.
28
Id.
29
See infra Part I.B.
30
See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, Constitutionalizing Class Inequality: Due Process in
State Farm, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1035, 1035–36 (2008) (“[T]he Constitution treats questions of economic inequality as matters of policy largely immune from scrutiny by the judicial branch.”).
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American poverty law31 and is embedded in the federal judiciary’s broader retreat from
fundamental rights enforcement over the last forty years.32 This indifference to class
dictates a distinctive approach to positive socioeconomic rights as well as negative
protections against discriminatory state action.
With respect to positive rights, American constitutional law unambiguously rejects
any affirmative claim to minimal material security33 despite repeated calls for the recognition of such interests.34 As then-judge Antonin Scalia wrote in 1986, “It is impossible to say that our constitutional traditions mandate the legal imposition of even so
basic a precept of distributive justice as providing food to the destitute.”35 Most
generally, the doctrine is but one manifestation of a broader conception of the Constitution as a guarantor of negative rights that imposes no affirmative duty on the state
to protect or sustain the populace.36 In particular, the absence of positive socioeconomic
rights reflects the fact that the Constitution lacks express language addressing such
One of the few exceptions to this principle is the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, which
imposes an affirmative state obligation to provide representation for indigent defendants.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
17–19 (1956). The Court has also barred economic discrimination in the exercise of the franchise. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667–68 (1966). Outside the context of
criminal prosecutions and the right to vote, however, American constitutional law is generally
indifferent to the fact that poverty may impair or preclude the exercise of other rights. See,
e.g., infra notes 58–59.
31
See Nice, No Scrutiny, supra note 7, at 629–36.
32
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 111, 123–24 (2004) (discussing deconstitutionalization of education-related interests of
racial minorities and the poor); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the
Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1118–20 (1978) (discussing the deconstitutionalization of criminal procedure); Richard K. Sherwin, Rhetorical Pluralism and the
Discourse Ideal: Countering Division of Employment v. Smith, A Parable of Pagans, Politics,
and Majoritarian Rule, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 388, 423–24 (1991) (discussing “the Court’s deconstitutionalization of basic aspects of the freedom of religious conscience”).
33
See, e.g., Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (“The
Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not
require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service
as maintaining law and order.”); Robin West, Katrina, the Constitution, and the Legal Question
Doctrine, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127, 1134–35 (2006).
34
See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED
AND UNNAMED 141–65 (1997); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution:
Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 19–43 (1987); Frank I. Michelman,
The Supreme Court 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social
Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1254–56 (1965); Lawrence G. Sager,
Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 410, 429–33 (1993).
35
Antonin Scalia, Scalia Speaks, WASH. POST, June 22, 1986, at C2.
36
See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768–69 (2005); DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); West, supra note 33, at 1134–35.
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interests,37 unlike the majority of constitutions enacted in the modern era,38 as well
as a national sentiment that is relatively unreceptive to redistributionist principles39 and
an increasingly conservative Supreme Court that for forty years has emphatically
rejected any reading of the Constitution that might accommodate such values.40
This defining characteristic of the American approach to social welfare contrasts
with the recognition by most comparable constitutional states of some minimal interest
in health, education, and material security as an element of protected human dignity.41
The Italian Constitutional Court, for example, has held that “the right to health . . . [is]
protected by the [Italian] Constitution as an inviolable part of human dignity. There
can be no question that the right of poorer citizens . . . to free health care comes under
this heading.”42 German constitutional doctrine likewise exempts from taxation “income that is minimally necessary for a humane existence—a ‘subsistence minimum . . . .’”43 The law of most European nations follows suit,44 and the obligations
imposed by the leading international treaty on socioeconomic rights bind most other
nations to similar commitments.45 Conspicuously, the United States is not among the
160 states that are party to the agreement.46
37

Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic
Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 3–4, 8 (2005).
38
Id. at 4.
39
See, e.g., id. at 17–19; cf. Dennis Jacobe, Americans Oppose Income Redistribution To Fix
Economy, GALLUP (June 27, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/108445/americans-oppose
-income-redistribution-fix-economy.aspx (noting that 84% of surveyed adults oppose taking
steps to distribute wealth more evenly among Americans).
40
Sunstein, supra note 37, at 19–23; Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 123–24.
41
See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS 220 (2008).
42
Corte Cost., 16 Luglio 1999, n. 309, Racc. uff. corte cost. 1999, 29 (It.), translated in
NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 1363 (2d ed. 2010).
43
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 10, 1998, 99
ENTSCHEDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 216 (Ger.), translated in
DORSEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 1354.
44
See, e.g., DORSEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 1354; TUSHNET, supra note 41, at 220;
Sunstein, supra note 37, at 3–4.
45
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; see, e.g.,
John H. Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 201 (2009).
Article 11 of the Covenant recognizes “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions.” ICESCR art. 11, ¶1. Articles 12 and 13 recognize corollary
rights to health and education. ICESCR art. 12, 13. In view of these provisions, “a State party
in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is,
prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.” U.N. Comm. on Econ.,
Soc. and Cultural Rights [CESCR], Gen. Comment No. 3, para. 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/22-E
/CN.4/1991/1 Annex III (1990).
46
U.N. Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-3.en.pdf. The
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The formal irrelevance of class in the American system also bears on the scope
of the poor’s negative protections against discriminatory state action. Under equal
protection doctrine, special scrutiny is brought to bear on discriminatory enactments
that draw suspect classifications.47 To qualify as suspect, a legislative classification
must target a class that is “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”48
For decades scholars have made the case that indigence meets these core criteria and
that the poor accordingly should be entitled to heightened scrutiny when challenging
class-based legislative burdens.49 While the Supreme Court briefly flirted with the
idea,50 it ultimately and definitively rejected the proposition in Dandridge v. Williams51
and a series of subsequent cases in which the Court withdrew entirely from the field and
suspended review of virtually all discriminatory classifications burdening the poor.52
As John Hart Ely summarized, “the retreat from the once glittering crusade to extend
special constitutional protection to the poor has turned into a rout.”53 Discriminatory
enactments targeting the indigent accordingly receive the lowest and most permissive
degree of scrutiny, requiring only that there be some conceivably rational basis for the
government to burden the poor as it has.54 As a practical matter, this prohibits little
more than legislative animus.55
United States signed the ICESCR in 1977 but the Senate never ratified the treaty. Id.; see
Sunstein, supra note 37, at 15.
47
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
48
San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 28; see Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974);
William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional
Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45
UCLA L. REV. 385, 415–16 (1997).
49
See, e.g., Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 117–30; Edelman, supra note 34;
Loffredo, supra note 9, at 1306–13; Michelman, Forward, supra note 34, at 21; Lawrence Sagar,
Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV.
767, 785–87 (1969).
50
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968);
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);
cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
51
397 U.S. 471 (1970).
52
Id. at 487; see, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977); Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548–51 (1972); Loffredo, supra note 9, at 1306–13 (summarizing
case authority).
53
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 148 (1980).
54
See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973); Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 508
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
55
See West, supra note 33, at 1137 (“Thus, it is arguable, given our doctrine, that legislators
cannot deny to poor people rights or privileges or goods solely on the grounds of their poverty,
where that poverty bears no relation to any legitimate public purpose.”); cf. Loffredo, supra note
9, at 1283–84.
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The practical consequences of this doctrinal indifference cut sharply against the
interests of the poor. As commentators have often observed, the construed Constitution’s formal neutrality on questions of class is highly discriminatory in its secondary
substantive effects56—an elaboration of Anatole France’s familiar remark that the law
in its “majestic equality . . . forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to
beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.”57 Without the minimal resources necessary
to access and exercise rights, the promise of formal neutrality is substantively hollow:
a poor woman cannot exercise her right to abortion if she cannot purchase the procedure,58 nor can the poor exercise equal rights of political participation if they cannot buy
access to the conversation itself.59 Likewise, without heightened negative protections
against discriminatory legislation, the poor are at the practical mercy of lawmakers
whose political debts rarely trace back to empty pockets. Robert Bork’s infamous
assertion in 1979 that “the poor and the minorities . . . have done very well” in the political process, and thus need no special protection from it,60 has been reduced to malevolent farce by the intervening three decades of legislative animosity and escalating
distress among America’s indigent.61
The rights deficit of the American poor influences the terms of political discourse
as well. Irrespective of the degree to which positive socioeconomic rights are judicially
enforceable—and there is great disparity in that regard among nations recognizing
such interests62—the mere articulation of a right can legitimate corresponding claims
in the political sphere.63 Citing the experience of South Africa, Frank Michelman
56

See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Cluster III—Introduction, 55 FLA. L. REV. 319, 334–35 (2003);
West, supra note 33, at 1138.
57
ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., John Lane Co. 1914)
(1894).
58
See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 434 U.S. 464, 470–71
(1977).
59
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (rejecting as illegitimate any “governmental
interest in equalizing the relative [economic] ability of individuals and groups to influence the
outcome of elections [as an incident of the First Amendment].”).
60
Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 701 (“The premise that the poor or the black are underrepresented politically
is quite dubious. In the past two decades we have witnessed an explosion of welfare legislation,
massive income redistributions, and civil rights laws of all kinds. . . . [T]he welfare-rights theory
rests less on demonstrated fact than on a liberal shibboleth.”).
61
See, e.g., Budd, supra note 10, at 376–80; Julie A. Nice, Forty Years of Welfare Policy
Experimentation: No Acres, No Mule, No Politics, No Rights, 4 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 4–5,
9, 12 (2009) [hereinafter Forty Years]; Mark R. Rank, Rethinking the Scope and Impact of
Poverty in the United States, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 165, 170–76 (2007).
62
See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82
TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1898–1909 (2004).
63
See, e.g., id. at 1901; cf. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,
1364–65 (1988).
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describes how merely declaratory socioeconomic rights supply “a useful basis on which
to engage governments in a kind of public cross-examination of their relevant laws and
policies.”64 Julie Nice conversely notes that the rights deficit in the American context
contributes to “a dialogic default on the very question of economic justice.”65 As Nice
argues, the inability of the American poor to ground political advocacy in rights rhetoric
has frustrated their claims to social and economic inclusion, which in turn has reinforced the perceived illegitimacy of corresponding claims in the judicial context.66
B. The Veiled Constitution and Class Bias
As the preceding sketch suggests, the declared Constitution is unapologetically
indifferent to class. Proponents concede that the doctrine offers scant hope for the poor
but assert that the case for distributive justice is moral, not constitutional, and thus must
be made outside the judicial sphere.67 In this respect, the law as it relates to poverty
is overtly deconstitutionalized; it frankly acknowledges the irrelevance of class and
accepts with relative candor the harsh substantive implications of that precept. As
others have thoroughly documented, it is a jurisprudence that defies the effects of
poverty on the exercise of basic rights while failing to “center[] class in the judicial
analysis or creat[e] a humane and robust constitutional jurisprudence for socioeconomic disparity.”68
For all of its manifest failings, however, the doctrine of class indifference is at least
transparent: the law does what it purports to do. From the perspective of adjudicative
integrity, it is obviously quite a different matter when a jurisprudence is not merely unmoved by the brutal consequences of its stated terms but instead skews or misrepresents
the terms themselves to prejudice a particular class of disfavored litigants. This reaches
beyond class indifference to the question of veiled bias and the subconstitutional status
of the American poor. The articulation and enforcement of fundamental rights so as
to withhold from the poor the full force of generally applicable guarantees is not merely
an offense to the indigent but to the core legitimating principle of American constitutionalism: that the “equality of formal rights” will be “scrupulously maintained.”69
64

Frank Michelman, Economic Power and the Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020,
at 45, 52 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, eds., 2009).
65
Nice, Forty Years, supra note 61, at 9; cf. Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change
(or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
27 (2005).
66
See Nice, No Scrutiny, supra note 7, at 662–63; Nice, Forty Years, supra note 61, at 9
(“Poor people seem trapped in a perpetual stalemate: without rights, no politics and without
politics, no rights.”).
67
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 319–24 (1985); Antonin Scalia, Scalia Speaks, WASH. POST, June 22, 1986,
at C2 (“[T]he moral precepts of distributive justice . . . surely fall within the broad middle range
of moral values that may be embodied in law but need not be.”).
68
Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 112.
69
Loffredo, supra note 9, at 1358.
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For several decades, scholars writing in areas across the rights spectrum have
drawn attention to the veiled subordination of the poor through the enforcement of
purportedly neutral doctrine.70 Without attempting to classify the diverse manifestations of this bias, it is useful to distinguish generally between two particular ways in
which the subordinating process plays out. First, the articulation of certain constitutional doctrines itself embeds socioeconomic bias.71 In such cases, the law is enforced
on its stated terms but the terms themselves skew constitutional enforcement against
the interests of the poor.72 Second, and most threatening to the claim of legitimate
adjudication, are instances where the judiciary subordinates the rights of the poor by
simply ignoring or grossly misrepresenting the articulated doctrine itself.73 Both of
these processes are relevant to the poor’s inferior relationship with the Fourth Amendment’s privacy right.74
There are two dimensions of protected privacy under the Fourth Amendment, each
reflecting a different aspect of enforcement bias. First, the articulated doctrine protects
what the Supreme Court characterizes as “reasonable expectation[s] of privacy.”75 This
formulation embeds socioeconomic bias in the terms of the doctrine itself insofar as the
construction of “reasonableness” reflects a particular set of social arrangements and
assumptions that largely excludes the experience of the American poor.76 Second, and
70

See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Standards for Constitutional Review of Privacy-Invading
Welfare Reforms: Distinguishing the Abortion-Funding Cases and Redeeming the Undue-Burden
Test, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1996) (discussing “dual system” of constitutional enforcement in the
context of substantive due process rights); McCluskey, supra note 30, at 1057; Nice, No Scrutiny,
supra note 7, at 650–55; Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System Of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964) (Part I), 16 STAN. L. REV. 900
(1964) (Part II), and 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965) (Part III).
71
The doctrine of formal indifference also implicates socioeconomic bias insofar as it
ignores the practical impossibility of exercising certain fundamental rights without material
resources. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. In that respect, however, the doctrine
discriminates against the poor in its secondary effect, as the enforced law interacts with the
underlying material conditions of poverty; its enforcement in the first instance is classneutral. In contrast, the discriminatory impact discussed here is a primary effect the doctrine:
the law directly differentiates based on class and distributes its protections unequally in its
immediate application.
72
See, e.g., McCluskey, supra note 30, at 1043–57; infra Part I.B.1.
73
See, e.g., Budd, supra note 10, at 385–403; infra Part I.B.2.
74
See, e.g., Budd, supra note 10, at 385–403; Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of
Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 708 (2009); Nice, No Scrutiny, supra note 7, at
652–55; Slobogin, supra note 13, at 392; William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265 (1999) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment
Privacy]; William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1822–24
(1998) [hereinafter Race, Class, and Drugs].
75
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g.,
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
76
See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 798 (2006) [hereinafter Political Constitution].
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at its textual core,77 the Fourth Amendment protects certain uniquely inviolable physical
spaces per se—in particular, the home78 and the person.79 In decisions that barely
attempt to reconcile with prevailing authority, the courts have simply refused to
safeguard the poor when facing intrusions upon these uniquely protected interests.80
We consider each of these dimensions of the privacy right in turn.
1. Bias Embedded in the Privacy Doctrine
The discriminatory effect of the Fourth Amendment’s protection of “reasonable
expectations of privacy” is rooted in the formulation itself. The concept of reasonableness is irreducibly subjective; what may seem to be a reasonable expectation of
privacy to an indigent resident of a crowded tenement may seem entirely unreasonable to an affluent member of the federal bench. The Court attempts to address this
problem by declaring broadly that the relevant measure of reasonableness is the judgment of “society” generally.81 But there is no isolable “society” in a nation as diverse
and divided as ours.82 Necessarily, then, the Court must choose among competing perspectives and experiences to resolve the reasonableness inquiry. As Chief Judge Alex
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit recently noted, the Court predictably chooses its own:
There’s been much talk about diversity on the bench, but there’s
one kind of diversity that doesn’t exist: No truly poor people are
appointed as federal judges, or as state judges for that matter.
Judges, regardless of race, ethnicity or sex, are selected from the
class of people who don’t live in trailers or urban ghettos. The
everyday problems of people who live in poverty are not close
77

U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons [and]
houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
78
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980); see, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972).
79
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769–70 (1966); cf. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law.”).
80
See infra Part I.B.2 & Part II.D.3.
81
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Morgan
Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV.
199, 250 (1993) (“[B]y asking whether the expectation in dispute is one society is willing to recognize as reasonable, the test’s second prong implicitly encourages decisionmakers to define fundamental constitutional values by referring to contemporary social values, goals, and attitudes.”).
82
See, e.g., MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 158–61 (Touchstone 1997)
(1962).
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to our hearts and minds because that’s not how we and our
friends live.83
Thus the Court, in giving specific content to the category of reasonable privacy expectations, relies on a set of assumptions about prevailing social norms and arrangements that bears little relationship to the lives of the poor.84 In particular, the Court
links the reasonableness of privacy expectations to “the existence of ‘effective’ barriers
to intrusion”85 upon occupied space itself—a consideration that largely overlaps with
the exercise of private property rights.86 In spaces where one exercises no power to bar
intrusions—the underside of a bridge, for example, or a park bench—the doctrine
accordingly offers negligible protection.87 Obviously this concept of reasonableness
works well for those who can retreat to the private confines of their homes, offices, or
judicial chambers, but it leaves very little protected privacy for individuals without a
home or who share their physical space with others.88
Most of the American poor are not homeless, however, and have some private
space to call their own.89 Nevertheless, their ability to utilize that space for private
purposes is still differentially burdened by the reality that “the homes of the rich are
larger and more comfortable, making it possible to live a larger portion of life in them.
Privacy follows space, and people with money have more space than people without.”90
With relatively less access to private space, the poor spend a greater proportion of their
lives in available common space—such as parks, playgrounds, sidewalks, and streets—
83

United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from the denial of en banc review).
84
See, e.g., Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 76, at 798; Stuntz, Race, Class, and
Drugs, supra note 74, at 1823–24 (“Existing social arrangements define the Fourth Amendment
baseline. This proposition has large distributive consequences, for people with money enjoy
more privacy than people without.”).
85
Slobogin, supra note 13, at 401.
86
See Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from the denial of
en banc rehearing) (“The very rich [are] able to protect their privacy with the aid of electric
gates, tall fences, security booths, remote cameras, motion sensors and roving patrols . . . .”);
cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“The power
to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s
bundle of property rights.”).
87
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to
the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); see Slobogin, supra note
13, at 401.
88
See Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth
Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 541–42 & nn.94–95 (1978); Slobogin, supra note
13, at 401; Stuntz, Fourth Amendment Privacy, supra note 74, at 1266.
89
Jonathan L. Hafetz, Homeless Legal Advocacy: New Challenges and Directions for the
Future, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1215, 1223 (2003) (noting that between five and ten percent of
the poor experience homelessness in a given year).
90
Stuntz, Fourth Amendment Privacy, supra note 74, at 1270.
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where Fourth Amendment doctrine recognizes only limited privacy expectations.91
Necessarily then, the articulated doctrine, while neutral on its face, cuts powerfully
against the poor in its direct application.92
Speaking directly to his colleagues on the Ninth Circuit, Chief Judge Kozinski
recently decried this “unselfconscious cultural elitism”93 in a case upholding the ability
of police to surreptitiously attach a GPS tracking device to the underside of a car parked
in the driveway of a modest home:
[P]oor people are entitled to privacy, even if they can’t afford all
the gadgets of the wealthy for ensuring it. . . . When you glide
your BMW into your underground garage or behind an electric
gate, you don’t need to worry that somebody might attach a tracking device to it while you sleep. But the Constitution doesn’t
prefer the rich over the poor; the man who parks his car next to his
trailer is entitled to the same privacy and peace of mind as the man
whose urban fortress is guarded by the Bel Air Patrol.94
2. Bias Enforced on the Privacy Doctrine
The second dimension of protected privacy relates to the first but predates and
subsumes it. Historically, the Fourth Amendment privacy right has reserved its highest
protection for certain textually-specified spaces—most prominently, the home and the
person.95 While the Court declared that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
91

See id. at 1271–72.
This embedded bias is evident in other areas of Fourth Amendment doctrine as well. For
example, in establishing the “reasonable suspicion” of wrongdoing required to justify a search
or seizure, the Supreme Court has identified two factors that embed profound class bias. First,
the Court has held that mere presence in a “high-crime area” independently contributes to suspected wrongdoing. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 147–48 (1972). This consideration applies in practice almost exclusively to poor
urban neighborhoods with high rates of street crime, thus placing an innocent poor person at
objectively greater risk of a permissible search than an identically situated individual in an
affluent community. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime
Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1605–06 (2008); Margaret Raymond,
Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in
Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 137–38 (1999). This bias is exacerbated
by the Court’s identification of “evasive” behavior as an additional factor contributing to reasonable suspicion. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. Given that “contact with the police can itself
be dangerous” for the urban poor, “unprovoked flight [by an innocent person] is neither ‘aberrant’ nor ‘abnormal.’” Id. at 132–33 (Stevens, J., concurring).
93
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from the denial of en banc rehearing).
94
Id.
95
See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
92
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places,”96 when it announced the reasonable expectation standard in 1967, it has subsequently and repeatedly underscored the singular protections afforded the home and
the person without first filtering its analysis through the lens of reasonable expectations.97 This reflects the indisputably protected status of these intimate spaces; it is
axiomatic that individuals possess the highest expectation of privacy within their
dwellings and with respect to their bodies, and the doctrine takes that premise as a
starting point.98
Nevertheless, the federal courts have withheld from the poor the full reach of these
doctrinally unambiguous protections as well. In the absence of any credible basis to
subordinate the interests of the poor in this respect, the courts have simply ignored or
distorted otherwise applicable authority.99 This doctrinal subterfuge has played out
primarily in the context of the poor’s privacy within the home—the location of the
Fourth Amendment’s “ultimate protection.”100 The long tradition of respecting the
sanctity of the home101 follows an equally long tradition of excluding the indigent from
the full reach of that protection,102 and the decisions of both the Supreme Court and the
intermediate appellate courts reflect the disjuncture.103
The Supreme Court spoke directly to the poor’s domestic privacy rights in its 1971
decision in Wyman v. James,104 which addressed the constitutionality of mandatory
home visits conducted by welfare caseworkers.105 In upholding the practice, Wyman
departed from Fourth Amendment doctrine in two significant respects. First, the Court
concluded that the visits were not “searches” at all within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment—and thus were not subject to constitutional review—because of their
96

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
Regarding the home, see, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999); Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Regarding the body, see, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 303 (1999); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968).
98
Id.; see, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (“[A] person’s body and home [are] areas afforded the greatest Fourth Amendment
protection.”); cf. Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 847–56 (1999);
Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 912 (2010).
99
See infra notes 104–55 and accompanying text.
100
United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 2002).
101
See Budd, supra note 10, at 359–63.
102
Id. at 363–68.
103
The one contemporary appellate opinion addressing the poor’s parallel right of bodily
privacy disparaged that interest as well but was reversed by an equally divided en banc court.
Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, judgment
vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc), rev’d by an equally divided court, 60 F. App’x
601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). That decision, addressing the permissibility of mandatory drug
testing as a condition of public assistance, is discussed in detail in Part II.D.3.
104
400 U.S. 309 (1971).
105
Id. at 310.
97
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predominantly rehabilitative (as opposed to investigatory) character and the fact that
they purportedly occurred by consent.106 This conclusion defied otherwise applicable
authority establishing that the presence or absence of criminal consequences has no
bearing on whether an intrusion constitutes a Fourth Amendment search,107 and that
consent, if any, serves not to eliminate a search but to validate it.108 Accordingly, the
Court was “unquestionably incorrect in its assertion that a home visit is not a search.”109
The second rationale offered in Wyman was equally suspect. Assuming arguendo
that home visits fell within the reach of the Fourth Amendment, the Court offered an
“ad hoc”110 list of reasons why the suspicionless and warrantless searches were nonetheless reasonable.111 The enumerated factors—including the non-criminal nature of the
visit, the friendly attitude of the caseworkers, and the state’s interests in fiscal integrity
and the welfare of poor children112—offered virtually no doctrinal support for the conclusion that the visits constituted a permissible entry in the absence of a warrant or suspicion.113 Wyman thus stood in obvious conflict with the surrounding body of Fourth
Amendment law, and the “glaring inconsistency” was not lost on the lower courts.114
As Christopher Slobogin notes, its analysis is coherent only “on the ground that the
homes of people on welfare get less Fourth Amendment protection.”115
Wyman, however, was limited in its scope. The Court stressed that its conclusions
turned upon the rehabilitative116 and non-invasive117 nature of the visit, which in the
Court’s estimation more closely approximated an interaction with “a friend to one in
need” than an adversarial encounter with the state.118 Whether or not one accepts that
characterization,119 the analysis clearly does not extend to endorse highly invasive investigative intrusions by law enforcement officers for the sole purpose of uncovering

106

Id. at 317–18.
See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 226 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting); Camara
v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967).
108
Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
109
5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 10.3(a) (4th ed. 2004).
110
Wyman, 400 U.S. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
111
Id. at 318–26 (majority opinion).
112
Id.
113
See Budd, supra note 10, at 369–73.
114
Reyes v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1224 (D. Minn. 1979); see, e.g., Blackwelder v.
Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 140–41 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
115
Slobogin, supra note 13, at 403.
116
Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317, 319–21, 323; see Budd, supra note 10, at 386–87.
117
Wyman, 400 U.S. at 321; see Budd, supra note 10, at 393–94.
118
Wyman, 400 U.S. at 323; see Gustafson, supra note 74, at 700.
119
See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1720–22 (1998); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty:
Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L. J. 1499, 1522–25 (1991).
107
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evidence of ineligibility or fraud.120 However, those are precisely the practices that the
intermediate courts have recently read Wyman to sanction.121
In the wake of federal welfare-reform legislation devolving administrative authority
for public assistance to state and local governments,122 many jurisdictions have utilized
their new discretion to impose exceptionally harsh verification procedures on aid applicants and recipients.123 Among the requirements is an updated variant of the Wyman
home visit that lacks virtually all of its moderating characteristics.124 The prototype for
these new home visits is San Diego County’s “Project 100%,” which employs investigative practices that are among “the most aggressive in the country.”125 As a condition
of public assistance, all aid applicants in the county must agree to an unscheduled home
visit by a sworn law-enforcement investigator from the District Attorney’s Public Assistance Fraud Division.126 Refusal to permit the visit or to accept the scope of the investigator’s inspection results in the denial of benefits.127 The visit itself is exclusively
for investigatory purposes and has no rehabilitative component.128 Once in the home,
the investigator’s discretion is unlimited and any area of the home is subject to inspection.129 Investigators accordingly rifle through dresser drawers, medicine cabinets,
closets, and refrigerators,130 all in search of evidence of ineligibility or fraud.131

120

See, e.g., Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); Budd, supra note 10, at 386–95.
121
Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 918–19, 923–25 (9th Cir. 2006); S.L. v.
Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299, 1306–11 (7th Cir. 1995); cf. Smith v. L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors,
128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712–14 (Ct. App. 2002).
122
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA),
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see Matthew
Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial
Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1145–86 (2000); William P. Quigley, Backwards into
the Future: How Welfare Changes in the Millenium Resemble English Poor Law of the Middle
Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 102 (1998).
123
See Amy Mulzer, Note, The Doorkeeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of
Verification Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
663, 674–78 (2005).
124
See Budd, supra note 10, at 379–85.
125
Gustafson, supra note 74, at 646.
126
Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 918–20; Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 2003 WL 25655642,
at *2 (S.D. Cal. March 10, 2003), aff’d, 464 F.3d 916.
127
Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919; Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at *2.
128
Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919; see id. at 935 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
129
Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at *8 n.8 (“[N]o specific protocol limits where the investigator may look . . . .”).
130
Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919; id. at 936 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
131
Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at *2, *8 n.8; Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at
9–10, Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (No. 04-55122), 2004 WL 1949000, at *23–25.

2011]

PLEDGE YOUR BODY FOR YOUR BREAD

769

In Sanchez v. County of San Diego,132 the Ninth Circuit relied on the “radically
different”133 facts of Wyman as controlling authority for the conclusion that Project
100% does not even implicate the Fourth Amendment search doctrine134—or, in the
alternative, that its practices are a reasonable exercise of the search power in the absence
of suspicion or a warrant.135 Other courts have reached the same holding on similar
facts.136 To equate Wyman’s friendly visit with an adversarial search by sworn fraud
investigators, however, defies any plausible comparison.137 As seven circuit judges
noted in their dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in Sanchez, “The differences
between San Diego’s program and the program in Wyman are of a quality and character that cannot be ignored. . . . [T]he simple fact of the matter is that a home visit in
Sanchez is fundamentally different from a home visit in Wyman.”138
There is a second reason why Wyman cannot support these contemporary search
practices: it no longer states the relevant Fourth Amendment standard for the intrusions
at issue.139 Idiosyncratic from the start, Wyman was long ago superseded by the specialneeds doctrine as the appropriate analytic framework within which to assess warrantless
and suspicionless searches for purposes unrelated to law enforcement.140 Under the
special-needs analysis, courts engage in a reasonableness calculation that directly balances the magnitude of the threatened privacy loss against the weight of the state’s
countervailing interest in the search at issue.141 Under prevailing authority, this balancing calculation cannot possibly authorize the practices at issue in San Diego and
related jurisdictions.142 On one side of the equation is a privacy interest of the highest
order—the sanctity of the home itself.143 On the other side of the equation is an entirely
pedestrian administrative objective—the state’s general interest in the fiscal integrity
132

464 F.3d 916. Before joining the faculty of University of New Hampshire School of Law,
the author served as Legal Director of the ACLU Foundation of San Diego & Imperial Counties
and in that capacity represented the plaintiff class in Sanchez.
133
Id. at 938 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
134
Id. at 921 (“Wyman directly controls the instant case.”).
135
See id. at 923–25.
136
S.L. v. Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299, 1307 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We are bound by Wyman”); see
also id. at 1306–11; cf. Smith v. L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712–14
(Ct. App. 2002).
137
See Budd, supra note 10, at 386–95.
138
Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
139
See, e.g., Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 922 n.8.
140
See generally Budd, supra note 10, at 395–97; Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, “Special
Needs” and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference
Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529 (1997).
141
See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
142
See infra notes 143–47 and accompanying text; see also Part II.D.1.
143
See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
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of a benefits program144—that falls well outside the relatively narrow range of public
safety145 and in loco parentis146 concerns that the Court has recognized as sufficient to
justify a special needs search.147
In the face of this doctrinal impediment, the Ninth Circuit simply distorted both
sides of the analytic equation.148 As to the privacy interest at stake, the Sanchez court
explicitly equated welfare recipients with convicted felons to establish the proposition
that the poor have a diminished expectation of privacy within their homes—citing as
controlling authority a case that permits a state’s penal authorities to search the home
of a probationer without a warrant.149 Taking a slightly different tack, other courts have
returned to Wyman as authority for some generalized diminution in the expectation of
privacy of all welfare recipients, simply by virtue of their receipt of a public benefit.150
Stating the obvious but to no avail, the dissenting judge in Sanchez reminded his colleagues that “unlike convicted felons, welfare applicants have no lesser expectation of
privacy in their homes than the rest of us.”151
On the other side of the equation, Sanchez and related cases have declared that the
state’s pedestrian fiscal interests are sufficient to support the intrusions at issue, despite
the absence of any special-needs authority to support the assertion, and have notably
failed to acknowledge the broader consequences of their reasoning.152 If the state may
search the home of any recipient of a public benefit merely to verify compliance with
administrative requirements, the search power is essentially unlimited in its application
to the general population—since it is exceedingly difficult to find anyone who is not
a recipient of some public benefit, subsidy, credit, or deduction that depends in part
on representations about conditions within one’s home.153 Of course, the prospect of
144

Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting from denial of en banc review).
145
See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989); Skinner, 489
U.S. at 634; Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987); cf. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305, 323 (1997) (“[W]here, as in this case, public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth
Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged.”); Bd.
of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836–37 (2002).
146
Earls, 536 U.S. at 836–37; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–57
(1995).
147
See, e.g., Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309 (referring to the “closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches”).
148
See Budd, supra note 10, at 397–403.
149
Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 925 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872–73 (1987)).
150
S.L. v. Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299, 1310 (7th Cir. 1995); Smith v. L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712 (Ct. App. 2002).
151
Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 940 (Fisher, J., dissenting); see Gustafson, supra note 74, at 708.
152
See Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 926; Whitburn, 67 F.3d at 1310; Smith, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712.
153
See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 343 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Sanchez,
464 F.3d at 941 n.12 (Fisher, J., dissenting); Slobogin, supra note 13, at 403 (“Those
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the federal courts authorizing such a sweeping expansion of the search power is nonexistent as a practical and jurisprudential matter,154 and it is beside the point to worry
about the possibility. Sanchez and related authorities do not threaten the broader security of Americans in their homes; they instead demonstrate that the poor stand alone,
beneath those protections, and face unique intrusions based on rationales that apply to
no one else.155
3. Rationalizing Bias: Poverty as a Proxy for Cause
Unusual in several respects, these cases are notable in particular for the degree to
which they overtly mischaracterize controlling authority. This is not the way courts
typically go about their business,156 however politicized one believes them to be,157 and
the holdings raise obvious questions regarding subjective motivation and intent. At
one end of the explanatory spectrum is simple malice—the possibility that the decisions
arise from unvarnished class animus. Innumerable intermediate possibilities range
forward from that point, involving various shades and degrees of cognitive dissonance,
objectification, paternalism, and the like.158 At the far end of the spectrum is the possibility that the judges have no subjective sense whatsoever of how far outside the parameters of conventional adjudication these cases fall.159
suspected of tax fraud get full Fourth Amendment protection; those suspected of welfare fraud
get none.”); Note, Ninth Circuit Upholds Conditioning Receipt of Welfare Benefits on Consent
to Suspicionless Home Visits—Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1996,
2003 (2007).
154
See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (observing that the
Fourth Amendment must be construed to prohibit suspicionless intrusions “from becoming
a routine part of American life.”).
155
See Sanchez, 483 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting from denial of
en banc review).
156
Cf. Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96
VA. L. REV. 719, 758–60 (2010).
157
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 17–57, 147–50 (2006).
158
Cf. Bradley W. Joondeph, The Many Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Decision Making,
77 UMKC L. REV. 347, 374 (2008) (“[J]udges’ subjective motivations can only explain a part
what is going on in their decisions. Human beings are often, and perhaps mostly, unaware of
why they hold particular beliefs or choose certain courses of action.”).
159
Id. at 375 (“Thus, even if judges subjectively experience their decision-making as an
attempt to reach the most coherent, logical reading of the relevant legal authorities, their own
perceptions generally misapprehend much of what actually determines their behavior. The judges
themselves can only see a part of what moves them. No matter what they write in their opinions,
or how much they might protest to the contrary, there is much more to their choices than the objective interpretation of law. Forces external to the law and outside the judges’ cognition shade
their interpretations of texts and precedent and frame their readings of history and tradition.”
(footnote omitted)).
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The complexity of the question is confounding, to say the least, and any effort to
address it would be an ambitious project of its own. There is, however, a related and
more modest inquiry that sheds some light on the internal logic of these decisions.
Presuming a judge were interested in rationalizing the outcomes as the product of
legitimate adjudication, any explanation would necessarily require some articulation
with the values of the Fourth Amendment itself. The narrower question, then, is how
might the wholesale suspension of the poor’s domestic privacy rights be articulated
with those values—and, in particular, the Fourth Amendment’s emphasis on individualized suspicion?160
A possible answer begins with the broader societal conception of the poor that contextualizes the decisions. As the literature exhaustively documents, the “able-bodied”
poor have been demonized for centuries as indolent, immoral, and intrinsically predisposed to their predicament.161 This caricature traces back to the colonial era162 and has
played a central role in shaping the contemporary American ideology of class.163 Most
recently, the stereotypical account of the poor—and, more specifically, of welfare recipients—has taken the form of the mythical “welfare queen”164 or “welfare mother”165
whose imagined exploits continue to shape the public debate surrounding issues of
socioeconomic justice.166 Reinforcing this longstanding caricature has been the increasing isolation and residential segregation of poor Americans, who are now largely
invisible to broader society.167 As the lives of the poor become more divorced from
the experience of others, the dehumanizing and reductionist force of the caricature
160

See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).
See, e.g., MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN 144–45 (1988); Budd,
supra note 10, at 363–65; Gustafson, supra note 74, at 648–55; Quigley, supra note 122, at
105–06; William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteen States,
31 U. RICH. L. REV. 111, 114 (1997) [hereinafter Reluctant Charity]; Ross, supra note 119, at
1502–08; see generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986).
162
See Ann M. Burkhart, The Constitutional Underpinnings of Homelessness, 40 HOUS. L.
REV. 211, 221–22 (2003).
163
See, e.g., HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR 74–102 (1995); Ross, supra
note 119, at 1502–08.
164
See, e.g., Peter Edelman, The World After Katrina: Eyes Wide Shut?, 14 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 3–4 (2007); Gustafson, supra note 74, at 655–58; April Land, Children
in Poverty: In Search of State and Federal Constitutional Protections in the Wake of Welfare
“Reforms,” 2000 UTAH L. REV. 779, 811.
165
Thomas W. Ross, The Faith-Based Initiative: Anti-Poverty or Anti-Poor?, 9 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 167, 172 (2002).
166
See, e.g., Gustafson, supra note 74, at 658–64; Ross, supra note 165, at 172.
167
See, e.g., HARRINGTON, supra note 82, at 2–7; Debra Lyn Bassett, Distancing Rural
Poverty, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 3, 13 (2006) (“[P]overty is literally out of sight as
well as out of mind.”); David Ray Papke, Keeping the Underclass in its Place: Zoning, the Poor,
and Residential Segregation, 41 URB. LAW. 787, 788 (2009) (“[C]ontemporary American metropolitan areas remain overwhelmingly segregated by socioeconomic class.”).
161
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correspondingly increases168—and the strengthening caricature, in turn, further intensifies the isolation of the poor.169 Over time, the individual fades into the encompassing myth.
So objectified, welfare recipients as a class are understood to possess characteristics that evoke the reasonable suspicion and disdain of broader society. As Kaaryn
Gustafson has recently documented, these imputed qualities increasingly correspond
not merely with poverty but with criminality as well.170 She notes that “welfare applicants are treated as presumptive liars, cheaters, and thieves,”171 and that federal and
state welfare laws increasingly “assume[] a latent criminality among the poor.”172
Consistent with these assumptions, contemporary state and federal welfare policy is
punitive, adversarial, and distrustful.173 Surveillance, sanctions, and verification “extremism” are now prominent characteristics of welfare administration,174 all with the
intended purpose of reducing the total number of individuals receiving relief175—either
by blocking entry to the programs at the front end176 or by terminating benefits as
quickly as possible.177 Thus it comes as no surprise that the number of individuals
receiving federal welfare assistance has dropped precipitously178 as the poverty rate
escalates.179 These outcomes coincide with the archaic notion that the immorality of
the poor is the ultimate cause of their plight and that the state’s capacity and responsibility to ameliorate poverty is limited as a result.180
This conception of the indigent influences judicial perceptions as well.181 As
Thomas Ross notes, “When judges construct their arguments, they must depend on
168

See, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Inequality, and Class in the Structural Constitutional
Law Course, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1239, 1247 (2007) (“This socially constructed otherness
of the poor is reinforced by (or perhaps serves as justification for) the social and spatial
isolation of low-income families in economically segregated neighborhoods and inferior
public schools.”).
169
See Ross, supra note 119, at 1503 (“[The poor] have been cast as different, deviant,
and morally weak. These assumptions make coherent the physical separation of the poor from
the affluent.” (footnote omitted)).
170
Gustafson, supra note 74, at 665–66; see also CYNTHIA A. BRIGGS & JENNIFER L.
PEPPERELL, WOMEN, GIRLS, AND ADDICTION 126 (2009).
171
Gustafson, supra note 74, at 646.
172
Id. at 647.
173
See id.
174
See id. at 646; Mulzer, supra note 123, at 674–78.
175
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)–(b) (2006); Diller, supra note 122, at 1178–84.
176
See, e.g., JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND
THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 40 (2001).
177
See, e.g., Diller, supra note 122, at 1171, 1184.
178
See id. at 1123; Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a
Community-Based Welfare System, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 741 & n.85 (2005); Land, supra
note 164, at 818.
179
See Rank, supra note 61, at 170–76.
180
See, e.g., Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 125–26.
181
See, e.g., id. at 126; Budd, supra note 10, at 403–06; Ross, supra note 119, at 1513–38.
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assumptions widely shared by their audience. Judges depend on these assumptions
both because they give their arguments power and the potential for influence, and because the judges, as members of the culture, are likely to believe them.”182 The Fourth
Amendment’s skewed application to the poor occurs against the backdrop of such assumptions, and considering the law in that broader context suggests a rough logic to
the judicial bias. If welfare recipients are understood in the collective (sub)consciousness as a malingering class of “liars, cheaters, and thieves,”183 it is then only a
small step to the conclusion that each among them merits suspicion by virtue of that
status. In this sense, the outcomes in Wyman, Sanchez and related cases begin to align
on some visceral level with the Fourth Amendment’s normative allocation of privacy.
Quite simply, poverty serves as a proxy for cause, relieving the state of the obligation
to establish individualized suspicion when it seeks to search the homes—and perhaps
the bodies—of the intrinsically culpable poor.
To suggest that the popular conception of welfare recipients aligns with their
exclusion from specific Fourth Amendment protections is not to say that any judge
has purposively reasoned from one to the next. But it does imply that the deep and
wounding myth of the immoral poor has particular resonance for a doctrine that turns
on subjective judgments about the “reasonableness” of the state’s suspicions. As
part of the context within which those judgments have been made, the caricature of
the poor may well have exerted some influence over the judiciary’s decision to classify
welfare recipients as a presumptively suspect class—whether or not the courts consciously acknowledge the connection.184
II. POVERTY, PRIVACY, AND SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING
The poor’s exercise of Fourth Amendment privacy rights remains under siege.
Having authorized government to search the homes of welfare recipients without individualized suspicion or a warrant, the courts may soon be asked whether the bodies
of aid recipients are subject to similar intrusions. Over the last three years, proposals
to drug-test welfare recipients have emerged as a significant legislative trend across
the country.185 Introduced in just a few legislatures in 2007, drug testing legislation
appeared in over half of the states by 2009.186 The bills have garnered increasingly substantial support, with some having passed at least one legislative chamber.187 Recently
182

Ross, supra note 119, at 1513.
Gustafson, supra note 74, at 646.
184
See supra notes 158–59.
185
See infra Part II.C.
186
See infra notes 284 & 287.
187
See, e.g., Tom Breen, Some States, Including Minn., Move Toward Drug Tests For Welfare Recipients, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Mar. 26, 2009, http://www.startribune
.com/politics/state/41904442.html?elr=KArks:DCiUMcyaL_nDaycUiacyKUUr; Terry Ganey,
Senate Keeps Welfare Drug-Testing Item From Advancing, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Columbia,
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members of Congress have joined the effort and introduced legislation requiring all
states to test recipients of federally-funded public assistance.188 While very little
attention has yet focused on this emerging development, it may soon present the
judiciary with an important occasion to revisit its treatment of the poor’s right to
privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Involving suspicionless intrusions into one of
the two spheres of privacy at the apex of constitutional sanctity—the body itself—the proposals, if enacted, will require the courts to decide between two starkly
different visions of the privacy right.
A. Prelude: Federal Welfare Reform
The recent surge in mandatory drug testing proposals traces back to a provision
of federal welfare reform passed in 1996.189 Among a vast array of punitive provisions
that fundamentally altered the nature of federal public assistance,190 the legislation expressly authorizes individual states to impose drug testing as a condition of aid: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, States shall not be prohibited by the Federal
Government from testing welfare recipients for use of controlled substances nor from
sanctioning welfare recipients who test positive for use of controlled substances . . . .”191
This provision is one of several that address drug use among welfare recipients,
including a related measure that permits states to impose a lifetime ban on aid to individuals who have been convicted of certain drug-related offenses.192
1. The Premise of the Addicted Poor
The legislative debates attending the passage of the federal statute made clear that
its proponents fully embraced the disparaging caricature of the American poor as well
as the corollary proposition that state aid only exacerbates the problem. In justifying
the legislation, a parade of representatives took to the floor to recite a litany of charges
Mo.), May 14, 2009, http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2009/may/14/senate-keeps-welfare
-drug-testing-item-from/; Press Release, Okla. State Senate, Senate Approves Measure Linking
Drug Testing to Welfare Eligibility (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.oksenate.gov/news/press_re
leases/press_releases_2009/pr20090225c.html; S. Minutes, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. Feb. 11, 2008).
188
Drug Free Families Act of 2009, S. 97, 111th Cong. § 2; Press Release, Sen. Orrin
Hatch, Hatch Introduces Amendment Requiring Drug Testing for Welfare, Unemployment
Benefits (June 15, 2010), http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases
.Detail&PressRelease_id=3d3e1ab4-1b78-be3e-e099-95c71cb7495e&Month=6&Year=2010.
189
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA),
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
190
See, e.g., Gustafson, supra note 74, at 658–78.
191
21 U.S.C. § 862b (2009).
192
Id. § 862a(a). PRWORA also authorized substance abuse treatment as part of “an individual responsibility plan” for welfare recipients. 42 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2)(A).
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against the “welfare system”193 and its recipient population. Speakers alleged that welfare teaches people “to depend on it and not to be able to depend on themselves,”194
“discourages thrift, discourages work, separates . . . and destroys families, isolates
children, and from an early age, stifles their ambition,”195 creates an environment that
“is not . . . morally healthy,”196 and “fosters poverty, despair, hopelessness, and illegitimacy.”197 Others asserted that “the Federal Government is completely incapable of helping these people”198 and that welfare instead constitutes “federally funded
child abuse.”199
Allegations of criminal behavior and drug abuse among welfare recipients were
high on the list of rationales recited in support of the bill.200 Representatives declared
that “[t]he high crime rates, the high drug abuse rates . . . are very, very closely linked
to our welfare system,”201 while others decried “the destructive practice of giving . . .
benefits to drug addicts and alcoholics, blighting their lives at great public expense.”202
Poor children, whose “ideologues and . . . role models are pimps and drug dealers,”203
were depicted as “selling drugs . . . [and] killing each other.”204 It was, in short, a world
of “skyrocket[ing]”205 crime, illegitimacy, “fraud, and abuse,”206 and Congress had a
“very straightforward” message in response: “No more money for nothing. . . . [G]et
a real job.”207
While empirical data regarding drug abuse among the poor played little part in the
hyperbolic political debate,208 it is noteworthy that the correlation between poverty and
drug addiction is quite weak. Researchers analyzing data from the National Longitudinal Alcohol Epidemiologic Survey—described by the National Institutes of Health as
the “‘gold standard’ for estimating the prevalence of adult alcohol and other drug disorders”209—concluded in 1996 that “[p]roportions of welfare recipients using, abusing,
193

142 CONG. REC. 17674 (1996) (statement of Rep. Ensign).
Id. at 17603 (statement of Rep. Kasich).
195
Id. at 17677 (statement of Rep. Traficant).
196
Id. at 17687 (statement of Rep. Buyer).
197
Id. at 17672 (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
198
Id. at 17618 (statement of Rep. Weldon).
199
Id. at 17674 (statement of Rep. Ensign).
200
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-651, at 4 (1996); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-725, at 490
(1996) (Conf. Rep.).
201
142 CONG. REC. 17618 (1996) (statement of Rep. Weldon).
202
Id. at 17674 (statement of Rep. English); see, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. Ensign) (“Should
we continue to give cash payments to prisoners and drug addicts?”).
203
Id. at 17614 (statement of Rep. Cunningham).
204
Id. at 17683 (statement of Rep. Shays).
205
Id. at 17674 (statement of Rep. Ensign).
206
Id. at 17687 (statement of Rep. Buyer).
207
Id. at 17672 (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
208
See generally supra notes 193–207 and accompanying text.
209
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Nat’l Insts. of Health, NIAAA Researchers Estimate Alcohol and Drug Use, Abuse and Dependence Among Welfare Recipients
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or dependent on alcohol or illicit drugs are consistent with proportions of both the adult
U.S. population and adults who do not receive welfare.”210 The researchers found that
the rate of alcohol abuse and/or dependence among welfare recipients ranged from 4.3
to 8.2 percent across five welfare programs, compared to a rate of 7.4 among the general population,211 while the rate of drug abuse and/or dependence among welfare
recipients ranged between 1.3 and 3.6 percent in comparison to a rate of 1.5 percent
among the broader population.212 Data from the National Household Survey of Drug
Abuse roughly coincides with these findings, with a rate of drug dependence among
welfare recipients in 1994 and 1995 of approximately four percent and a rate of alcohol
dependence of nine percent.213 Perhaps most notably, the data suggests that no more
than one in five welfare recipients uses an illicit drug in any given year—and half of
those individuals use marijuana alone.214 The depiction of aid recipients as welfareenabled drug addicts and the resulting statutory provisions authorizing drug testing
and related sanctions thus bear little relation to the actual lives of the American poor.
Finally, even if poverty did correlate with significantly higher rates of drug abuse
and addiction, the question of causation would remain: does the harsh reality of poverty
lead to drug use, or do reckless choices by individuals lead to addiction and then to
poverty as a secondary effect?215 The answer obviously bears on the punitive rationality
of get-tough proposals denying assistance to impoverished applicants who test positive
for illicit drug use. There are “surprisingly few studies”216 that have examined this relationship, and what little research exists suggests that there “is not a direct, causal relationship between the two social problems, but instead one which is mitigated by a range
of complex factors, including characteristics of the agent (e.g., alcohol), of the person
(e.g., coping style), and of the environment (e.g., availability of substances, family
structure, lack of job opportunities).”217 Rather than grapple with this complexity and
factual uncertainty, federal welfare policy simply posits the politically expedient myth
that drug abuse among welfare recipients is a volitional choice reflecting a punishable
moral failure.218 To the extent that the policy thus denies assistance to debilitated
(Oct. 23, 1996), available at http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/newsevents/newsreleases/pages
/welfare.aspx.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
RUKMALIE JAYAKODY ET AL., SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND WELFARE REFORM 2 (Nat’l
Poverty Ctr., Policy Brief Ser. No. 2, Apr. 2004), available at http://www.npc.umich.edu/pub
lications/policy_briefs/brief02/brief2.pdf.
214
Id.
215
See, e.g., Nancy J. Smyth & Kathleen A. Kost, Exploring the Nature of the Relationship
Between Poverty and Substance Abuse: Knowns and Unknowns, 1 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T
67 (1998).
216
Id. at 78.
217
Id.
218
See supra notes 193–207 and accompanying text.
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applicants whose drug use is enmeshed with the trauma of poverty, it simply exacerbates their misfortune.219
2. The Premise of State Dominion
Just as the 1996 federal legislation posits a caricature of the addicted poor, so too
it rests on a longstanding conception of the state’s dominion over the private lives of
welfare recipients. For centuries, the assistance of the state has come at the sacrifice
of personal autonomy.220 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, those
in need of public assistance were regularly auctioned off or indentured as laborers,
barred from moving to new communities, and functionally imprisoned in poorhouses.221 The process extended to children as well, whose labor could be auctioned
to pay a parent’s debts.222 In the early twentieth century, officials continued to closely
regulate the intimate lives of aid recipients—raiding their homes at night to search for
male visitors,223 barring evening dates for women receiving assistance,224 and mandating
religious instruction for dependent children.225 Investigators assessed the “suitability”
of applicants and denied aid based on “use of tobacco, lack of church attendance, dishonesty, drunkenness, housing a male lodger, extramarital relations, poor discipline,
criminal behavior, child delinquency, and overt child neglect. Agencies even forced
families to move from neighborhoods with questionable reputations.”226 Some of these
practices continued through the 1950s and 1960s, including most notably the use of
surprise midnight raids in search of male guests.227
This tradition of intrusion has extended to the bodily autonomy of welfare recipients, as several scholars have observed in the context of reproductive choice.228 In the
last twenty years, policymakers have considered a long list of measures linking the level
and availability of welfare benefits to marital status,229 limitations on childbearing,230
219
See, e.g., Harold A. Pollack et al., Substance Use Among Welfare Recipients: Trends and
Policy Responses, 76 SOC. SERV. REV. 256, 261 (2002).
220
See, e.g., GILLIOM, supra note 176, at 22–24.
221
See id. at 23–24; Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 161, at 140–75.
222
See Burkhart, supra note 162, at 223.
223
See Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?”: Reflections on the Home, the
Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 175, 208–09 (2002).
224
See id. at 222–23.
225
See GILLIOM, supra note 176, at 25.
226
ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 161, at 202.
227
See id. at 324–25; GILLIOM, supra note 176, at 31–32.
228
See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions
and Welfare, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931 (1995); Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division:
Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719 (1992).
229
See Williams, supra note 228, at 720.
230
See Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 151, 152–54 (2006).
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the use of contraception,231 and even “the sterilization of women on welfare as a condition of receiving benefits.”232 As Lucie White observes, “these kinds of ‘welfare
reform’ provisions [relate] back to this country’s long history of targeting the reproductive autonomy of poor women, particularly women of color. The powerful have
repeatedly marshalled state power to use the bodies of poor women to further their
own economic and symbolic ends.”233 Federal legislation permitting states to physically
intrude upon the bodies of welfare recipients for purposes of invasive extraction procedures continues quite literally in this incursive tradition.
3. The Irrelevance of Efficacy
Among the most striking aspects of the push for suspicionless drug testing, and
a telling indication that it has little to do with ordinary public policy concerns, is its
inefficacy in achieving any of the purported objectives associated with the procedure.
Drug testing is variously touted as a means of encouraging welfare recipients to
overcome substance abuse as a barrier to employment,234 stopping drug-related child
abuse,235 and removing government from the business of subsidizing drug addiction.236
All of these objectives rest, in part, on the unfounded premise that drug abuse is a significantly greater concern among the poor than in the general population.237 Putting
aside that assumption, however, the use of punitive drug testing to address issues surrounding drug abuse is a highly overinclusive and ineffective means of accomplishing
any of the declared policy goals.
First, a positive drug test reflects only recent drug use, not drug abuse or impairment, and is accordingly an overinclusive means of identifying drug-related dysfunction.238 Thus, “[i]f drug testing is used as a form of screening, many recipients likely
to test positive will be casual drug users who do not satisfy diagnostic criteria for
231

See Pamela D. Bridgewater, Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The Thirteenth
Amendment’s Role in the Struggle for Reproductive Rights, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 401,
404–08 (2000); Williams, supra note 228, at 720.
232
Smith, supra note 230, at 163; see Lynn M. Paltrow, Why Caring Communities Must
Oppose C.R.A.C.K./Project Prevention: How C.R.A.C.K. Promotes Dangerous Propaganda
and Undermines the Health and Well Being of Children and Families, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 11, 11–12,
93 (2003) (describing program that “offers $200 for current and former drug users to get sterilized or to use certain long-acting birth control methods”).
233
Lucie White, Searching for the Logic Behind Welfare Reform, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J.
427, 433–34 (1996).
234
See, e.g., Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d
by an equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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Id. at 1141.
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See, e.g., supra notes 200–02 and accompanying text; infra notes 276–83 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 209–14 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., Pollack et al., supra note 219, at 269.
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dependence.”239 Because “[w]idespread drug testing of welfare recipients will detect
use among many women who have no accompanying problem with impaired social
performance or employment,”240 it will inevitably sanction individuals for whom the
state has no cause for concern with respect to its stated objectives.
Second, drug abuse itself is not a significant contributing factor to welfare dependency. “Although [welfare] recipients have become more disadvantaged along
a number of characteristics related to health and mental health, substance abuse and
dependence is not a major contributor in defining the core group of recipients remaining on the rolls.”241 As noted above, the incidence of drug abuse among welfare
recipients is estimated to be no higher than four percent of the entire beneficiary population.242 If all illicit drug use were completely eliminated among recipients, the number
of individuals in need of public assistance would decline by no more than three to
five percent.243
Finally, current drug testing methods are poorly designed to detect the types of
illicit drug use that are most likely to impair the lives of welfare recipients. Because
drugs such as heroin and cocaine are metabolized quickly, their use is undetectable
within a few days of ingestion.244 By contrast, marijuana use is detectable for a much
longer period of time due to the fact that metabolites of the drug are fat soluble and thus
are retained in body tissue.245 The use of marijuana, however, has a less statistically
significant association with welfare receipt than even tobacco.246 Conversely, welfare
receipt is most powerfully associated with cocaine, a drug that current testing methods
regularly fail to detect.247 Compounding the poor fit is the exclusion of alcohol from
federally authorized drug testing,248 despite the fact that it is by far the most widely
abused drug among the recipient population.249
Summarizing these efficacy considerations, researchers from the University of
Michigan reached the following conclusions:
239
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FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE 84–112 (Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Research Monograph Series No.
73, 1987).
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Pollack, supra note 219, at 261–62.
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Most recipients likely to test positive are casual marijuana users
who do not satisfy DSM III-R criteria for drug-dependence. Moreover, the benefits of drug testing must be weighed against the potential misallocation of resources if positive results divert scarce
treatment slots to occasional users. . . . Suspicionless, populationbased chemical testing of welfare recipients will detect some “true
positives” who are drug-dependent, a greater number of “accidental
positives” with complex psychological problems, and a larger
group of “false positives” who have no apparent psychiatric (including drug-related) disorder. . . . [C]hemical testing [also] does
not detect the large group of “false negatives” . . . who are alcoholdependent or who experience psychiatric disorders, but who do
not use illicit drugs.250
That Congress pressed ahead with the authorization of punitive drug testing in the face
of such serious efficacy concerns lends considerable support to the suggestion that its
purpose had less to do with crafting coherent public policy than with the symbolic
affirmation of a politically expedient stereotype.
B. The Initial Response of the States
Following passage of federal welfare reform and its invitation to the states to
impose suspicionless drug testing on welfare recipients, several states responded by
adopting more limited programs that sought to avoid the most serious constitutional
concerns associated with mandatory testing.251 Many of these ongoing programs
apply only to convicted drug felons or other individuals for whom the state has some
individualized reason to suspect drug abuse.252 Other programs apply generally to
the applicant or recipient population but rely on noninvasive screening assessments
to identify individuals for whom there is reasonable suspicion to support more invasive
drug testing.253 The State of Idaho, for example, “requires substance abuse testing of
250

Harold A. Pollack et al., Drug Testing Welfare Recipients—False Positives, False Negatives, Unanticipated Opportunities, 12 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 23, 29–30 (2002).
251
This is not to suggest that the adopted measures are unobjectionable. To the contrary,
they raise serious legal and policy questions. See, e.g., Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams,
Making America “The Land of Second Chances”: Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for ExOffenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 527 (2006); Gustafson, supra note 74, at 672–74.
The focus here, however, is the particularly severe constitutional threat posed by suspicionless
drug testing.
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See, e.g., 2009 Ariz. Sess. Laws 3rd S.S., ch. 10, § 27; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:10
(2009); MINN. STAT. § 609B.435 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-29.1 (2009); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.2-605 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. §§ 49.79(5), 49.148(4) (2009).
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(2009).
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any [welfare] applicant or recipient, if the [state] has a reasonable suspicion they are
engaged in, or at high risk of, substance abuse. Testing will be conducted if screening
and assessment give a reasonable suspicion the participant is engaged in substance
abuse.”254 These programs may exist independently of or in combination with other
measures that temporarily or permanently bar the provision of aid to individuals convicted of certain drug-related offenses, as authorized by a separate provision of the
1996 federal statute.255
In contrast to this more limited approach, Michigan embraced the federal invitation
and enacted legislation in 1999 to impose suspicionless drug testing as a blanket condition of state aid.256 Michigan’s statute called for the establishment of a pilot program
in at least three counties as a prelude to statewide testing within the following four
years.257 The program required all new applicants to submit to a drug test and additionally mandated that twenty percent of existing recipients would be randomly tested
every six months.258 The statute directed that any individual testing positive would
participate in a substance-abuse treatment program259 and that noncompliance could
trigger the termination of aid.260 In the brief period that the program operated prior to
being enjoined by a federal court,261 the state tested 258 welfare applicants of whom
only twenty-one tested positive for illicit drug use.262 Consistent with the efficacy
considerations discussed above, all but three of those positive test results were for
marijuana use alone.263
As discussed in detail in Part II.D, below, the pilot program was challenged immediately and struck down by a district judge, who was then reversed by a three-judge
panel of the Sixth Circuit.264 The full circuit subsequently reheard the matter en banc
and upheld the district court by an equally divided vote.265 The constitutional question
was thus left entirely unresolved, and the resulting ambiguity has opened the door for
254
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other states to reconsider more aggressive drug testing proposals.266 Scores of such
proposals have appeared over the last three years,267 suggesting that the enactment and
implementation of another blanket testing program is a genuine threat.
C. The Legislative Groundswell
A recent survey of state legislative activity over the last three years reveals very
substantial renewed interest in aggressive drug testing of welfare applicants and recipients. Since 2007, lawmakers in at least thirty states and the District of Columbia
have proposed over sixty bills to impose testing requirements as a condition of eligibility for public assistance.268 With limited exception, this body of legislation provides
broadly for ongoing suspicionless testing and embraces the entire population of public
aid beneficiaries, but omits any privacy protections or procedural safeguards.269 Notably, the number of aggressive drug testing bills has climbed each of the last three
years,270 corresponding with the onset of the recent financial crisis271 and consistent
with the thesis that public policy grows increasingly punitive towards the poor during
periods of economic hardship.272 Whatever the cause may be, this legislative groundswell has quickly emerged as an important development with serious implications for
the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of the poor.
Consistent with the legislative history of the authorizing federal statute, recent
state efforts reflect a caricaturized conception of welfare recipients273 and make no
effort to grapple with data suggesting that drug dependence among the poor is not a
significantly greater concern than it is among the general population.274 The political
rhetoric thus depicts recipients as addicts and criminals, the welfare system as a counterproductive enabler of addiction, and drug abuse as a moral failing that drives families
into poverty.275 A state senator from Arizona captured these themes in his recent defense of a drug testing bill:
There’s a moral issue here. . . . If you’re getting taxpayer benefits,
and this isn’t money you’ve earned, you’re getting free stuff . . . .
266
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The minimum ought to be that you ought to not be somebody’s
[sic] that’s engaged in criminal activity. . . . A lot of the folks that
are in desperate need are (that way) because they have a substance
abuse problem. . . . So I’m hoping that this will drive them to get
help or at least protect the taxpayer from funding folks who need
to get their act together.276
Other state legislators describe drug testing proposals as an effort to “provide[] these
drug-addicted welfare recipients with the wake-up call they need,”277 to change “the
status quo system that enables drug addicts with taxpayer money,”278 “to prevent the
state . . . from becoming an enabler to addiction,”279 to assure that “taxpayers [do] not
have to subsidize drug abuse,”280 and to “protect[] our tax dollars from fueling drug
addictions.”281 The theme of moral failing pervades the debate: “individuals who continue to use drugs are unable to provide for their families and end up on public assistance,”282 and, once there, “[t]oo often . . . take advantage of our public assistance
program and try to pocket or use their extra funds to purchase items they’re not suppose
to such as drugs.”283 Against this backdrop of moral condemnation, the rising tide of
drug testing proposals is predictably severe.
1. The Elimination of Individualized Suspicion
The most significant attribute of recent legislative proposals is the overwhelming
absence of any requirement that individualized suspicion support invasive drug testing.
Suspicionless testing is thus a condition of aid embraced by forty-nine bills introduced
276

Drug Test for Arizona Welfare Recipients May Be Needed, DOUGLAS DISPATCH, Feb.
2, 2009, http://www.douglasdispatch.com/articles/2009/02/02/news/doc4987b79c7878776
7632585.txt (quoting Ariz. State Sen. Russell Pearce).
277
Party-Liners Again Reject Compassionate Reforms of Welfare System, CAL. CHRONICLE,
Apr. 29, 2009, http://www.californiachronicle.com/articles/view/100510 (quoting Cal. State
Sen. John Benoit).
278
Id.
279
Juana Summers, Missouri House Approves Drug Testing Welfare Recipients, But Proposal
Shows Trouble in Senate, ST. LOUIS TODAY, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.stltoday.com/news
/local/govt-and-politics/political-fix/article_12c95ddd-654b-56ed-943a-169704da04a6.html
(quoting Mo. State Sen. Gary Nodler).
280
Marshall Griffin, Missouri House Passes Bill to Require Drug Testing for Welfare
Recipients, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO NEWS, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.publicbroadcasting.net
/kwmu/news.newsmain/article/0/0/1611354/St.Louis.Public.Radio.News/Mo.House
.passes.drug.testing.bill (quoting Mo. State Rep. Ellen Brandom).
281
Lawmaker Introduces Bill to Require Drug Tests for Public Assistance, CBS NEWS
AUGUSTA (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.wrdw.com/home/headlines/42272572.html (quoting S.C.
State Rep. Rex Rice).
282
Press Release, Okla. State Senate, Senate Approves Measure Linking Drug Testing to
Welfare Eligibility (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://www.oksenate.gov/news/press_releases
/press_releases_2009/pr20090225c.html.
283
NY Spons. Memo., Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009).
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in twenty-seven legislatures since 2007,284 accounting for eighty percent of the identified drug testing legislation over the last three years. Ten legislatures— those of
Arkansas, California, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee—have each produced multiple bills providing for suspicionless testing,285 while seventeen others have each produced one such bill.286 By
contrast, only thirteen bills from seven states and the District of Columbia follow the
lead of earlier programs and limit invasive testing to circumstances supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion,287 often established by a preliminary noninvasive
assessment of the entire applicant or recipient population.288
284

H.R. 2678, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); H.R. 1281, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 216, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 384, 2009–2010
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008); S. 268, 149th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008); H.R. 4452, 96th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill.
2009); H.R. 389, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268,
116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Ind. 2008); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Kan. 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R.
137, 35th Reg. Sess. (La. 2009); H.D. 1300, 425th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); H.R. 6580,
94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 1982,
85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647,
124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419,
123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.R. 2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2008); Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S. 941, 2009 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009); S.
178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2009); S. 390, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2008); S. 606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); S. 832, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Pa.
2009); H.R. 1597, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731,
105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess
(Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 830, 81st Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.D. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009); S. 91, 59th Leg.,
Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).
285
See supra note 284.
286
See id. (Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming).
287
S. 1026 sec. 27, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); Council 661, 17th Council Period
(D.C. 2008); S. 1189, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008);
S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 868, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M.
2009); S. 614, 75th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008);
H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.R. 3209, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008).
288
See, e.g., Council 661, 17th Council Period (D.C. 2008); S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va.
2008); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008).
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Suspicionless testing under these bills takes one of two forms—it is either imposed
on an entire class of applicants or recipients or it is applied randomly to some subset of
the target population. In this regard, thirty-one bills in nineteen states impose invasive
testing upon their entire target population,289 while seventeen bills in ten legislatures
impose testing on randomly selected individuals.290 Two bills combine these methods
by testing the entire population of applicants while randomly testing some subset of the
larger class of current recipients.291
2. The Attributes of Testing: Breadth, Process, and Consequences
The surveyed legislation varies to some extent regarding the breadth of the population subject to drug testing, the steps taken to protect procedural integrity and personal
privacy, and the consequences of a positive test result. On balance, a substantial majority of the proposed bills apply to the broadest possible target population, provide
very few, if any, privacy or procedural protections, and impose the harshest possible
sanction for a positive drug test.
With respect to the breadth of the subject population, drug testing may target aid
applicants, current recipients, or both. Among the sixty-two identified bills introduced
289

H.R. 2678, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); H.R. 1281, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 216, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 268, 149th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R.
389, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009);
H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 137, 35th
Reg. Sess. (La. 2009); H.D. 1300, 425th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); H.R. 6580, 94th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); H.R. 1982, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007); Assemb. 3602, 231st
Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S. 941, 2009 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 390, 52d Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); S. 832, 2009–
2010 Reg. Sess (Pa. 2009); H.R. 1597, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 2648, 105th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2008); S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); S. 91, 59th Leg.,
Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).
290
S. 384, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2008); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008); H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb.,
1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 916, 124th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.R. 2342, 94th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C.
2009); H.D. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009).
291
S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2008).
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since 2007, over half—thirty-five—reach both categories.292 Of the remaining bills,
sixteen apply to recipients alone293 while eleven are limited to applicants for assistance.294 There are a few notable outliers. Two Mississippi bills from 2009 expand the
subject population to include children as young as thirteen years old.295 In an egalitarian
nod, two bills require drug testing not only of applicants and recipients but also of all
candidates for the Illinois state legislature296 and all sitting members of the Missouri
General Assembly.297
292

S. 1026 sec. 27, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); H.R. 2678, 48th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2008); H.R. 1281, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 216, 87th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R.
389, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008);
S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R.
190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 1982,
85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007); H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009);
S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 868, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 390, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 1513,
51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 614, 75th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S.
606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); S. 832, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess (Pa. 2009); H.R.
1597, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
(S.C. 2009); H.R. 830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.D. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W.
Va. 2009).
293
S. 384, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2008); S. 1189, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008);
H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); H.R. 137, 35th Reg. Sess. (La. 2009); H.R. 6580,
94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647,
124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419,
123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.R. 2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008);
S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.R. 3209, 60th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008); S. 91, 59th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).
294
Council 661, 17th Council Period (D.C. 2008); S. 268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ga. 2007); H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.D. 1300, 425th Sess.
Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S. 941, 2009 Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 2009); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 2648, 105th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008);
S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007).
295
H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2009).
296
H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009).
297
H.R. 2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).
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The testing itself requires the extraction and collection of bodily fluids and tissues
including blood,298 “urine, hair, saliva, sweat, or whatever [other] specimen proves to
be the most cost-effective.”299 Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority of the surveyed
legislation makes no mention of privacy protections for individuals facing such intimately invasive procedures.300 Only two bills specifically provide for the collection of
samples with “due regard to the privacy of the individual” and “in a manner reasonably
calculated to prevent substitutions or interference”301 with the collected material.
With respect to the use and distribution of test results, the legislation likewise
imposes few restrictions.302 A handful of bills require that results be maintained in
confidence, with no public disclosure except by consent of the person tested or pursuant
to a judicial order.303 Three other bills specify that positive test results may not be used
in criminal proceedings.304 Only one bill combines these protections of confidentiality
and immunity from prosecution.305 Similarly, the vast majority of legislation offers no
procedural safeguards with regard to the testing process.306 Bills proposed in Indiana,307
Missouri,308 and Tennessee309 provide for a hearing or other appeal of a positive test
result, while a few others require specific notice prior to actual testing.310 Bills in
Illinois,311 Indiana,312 and Tennessee313 provide for the retesting of samples to rule out
298

H.R. 868, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009).
H.R. 137, 35th Reg. Sess. (La. 2009).
300
See generally, supra notes 284, 287.
301
S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); see S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess.
(Iowa 2009).
302
See generally, supra notes 284, 287.
303
S. 268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); S. 1513, 51st Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); H.R. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009).
304
S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008);
H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008).
305
S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009).
306
See generally, supra notes 284, 287.
307
H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009);
H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008).
308
H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).
309
H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008).
310
H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008).
311
H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009).
312
H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009);
H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008).
313
H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008).
299
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false positives. Also to rule out false positives, a handful of bills allow individuals to
submit additional medical information that may provide an alternative explanation for
positive test results.314 Notwithstanding these provisions, fully two-thirds of the recent
legislation contains no privacy or procedural protections whatsoever.315
Finally, a substantial majority of the bills impose the harshest possible consequence
for a positive test result. Over two-thirds of the identified legislation, from twenty-one
states, mandates the immediate termination or denial of benefits as the sanction for a
positive test.316 Of these bills, several deny aid without specifying when, if ever, benefits might resume.317 Others permit individuals to reapply for assistance after some prescribed period of ineligibility.318 Among the bills requiring the denial or termination of
314

S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2009).
315
See supra notes 284, 287.
316
S. 1026 sec. 27, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); S. 268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ga. 2007); S. 1189, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Haw. 2008); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 389, 96th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009);
S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg.
Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 6580, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2008); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 1982, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn.
2007); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2008); H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2008); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 614, 75th Legis. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S. 832, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R.
830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.D. 3007, 79th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009); S. 91, 59th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).
317
See, e.g., S. 1189, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw.
2008); H.R. 389, 96th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 6580, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008);
H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 614, 75th Leg. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R.
2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Tenn. 2008).
318
See, e.g., S. 1026 sec. 27, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); S. 268, 149th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 4452,
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aid to a primary beneficiary, a few provide that aid to dependents may continue through
disbursements to a third-party payee.319 By contrast, only seventeen bills allow benefits
to be paid to an individual who tests positive for illicit drug use, typically on condition
that the recipient participate in a drug rehabilitation treatment program.320
Across the identified legislation, the most common provisions are invariably the
harshest. The typical bill applies without suspicion to the entire class of welfare applicants and recipients, makes no provision for the protection of either the individual’s
privacy during the testing process or the security of test results, affords no procedural recourse for individuals testing positive, and mandates the immediate denial
of aid to anyone identified as having used an illicit drug. While it is impossible to predict whether such legislation ultimately will be enacted, the character and intensity of
legislative activity over the last three years suggests that the possibility is significant.
D. Two Visions of a Constitutional Response
The enactment of suspicionless drug testing legislation will force the federal courts
to answer, finally, the constitutional question left open by the Michigan litigation.321
In assessing how the courts might approach the issue, the Michigan decisions are
highly instructive. The district court in Marchwinski considered the issue within the
conventional parameters of the Fourth Amendment and reached the straightforward
conclusion that the state’s blanket drug testing proposal was impermissible.322 On
96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Ill. 2009); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2008); H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2008); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.R. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(W. Va. 2009).
319
H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 1259, 94th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008).
320
H.R. 2678, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); S. 216, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ark. 2009); S. 384, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2008); Council 661, 17th Council Period (D.C. 2008); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); H.R. 4452, 96th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.D. 1300, 425th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); H.R.
2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 868, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009);
Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S. 390, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S.
606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); H.R. 1597, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007);
S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.R. 3209, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008).
321
See supra notes 264–65 and accompanying text.
322
Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d, 309 F.3d 330
(6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003), aff’d by
an equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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appeal, a panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed based on an entirely different, if unstated,
premise—that the poor constitute a subconstitutional class for purposes of the privacy
right and thus fall beyond the protections of conventional doctrine.323 These irreconcilable approaches perfectly mirror the parallel controversy, discussed above, over the
application of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy right to the homes of welfare recipients.324 If the federal courts are asked again to consider the question in the context of
suspicionless drug testing, the divergent outcomes in the Michigan litigation will frame
for the judiciary an unambiguous choice.
1. Bodily Privacy: A Preface
At the core of the Fourth Amendment is “the individual’s legitimate expectations
that in certain places and at certain times he has ‘the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.’”325 When the
state seeks to intrude upon the body, it implicates the “most personal and deep-rooted
expectations of privacy”326 grounded in the “moral fact that a person belongs to himself
and not others nor to society as a whole.”327 These deeply invested expectations trigger,
in turn, “the unique, significantly heightened protection afforded against searches
of one’s person.”328
The Fourth Amendment traditionally guards this private sphere through the dual
requirements of probable cause and a warrant. As the Court noted in Schmerber v.
California, both requirements apply with considerable force in the context of intrusions
upon the body.329 As to cause, the Schmerber Court noted:
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions [beyond the
323

309 F.3d 330.
See supra Part I.B.2.
325
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
326
Id. at 760.
327
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288
(1977)).
328
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999). The highly protected status of the
body is recognized across other constitutional doctrines as well, most notably as a component
of liberty and privacy under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S.
127, 135 (1992); Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79
(1990); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22, 229 (1990); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172–74 (1952); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942);
see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (“[Roe v. Wade] . . .
may be seen . . . as a rule . . . of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity
to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar
its rejection.”).
329
384 U.S. 757, 769–70 (1966).
324
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body’s surface] on the mere chance that desired evidence might be
obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law
officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless
there is an immediate search.330
The requirement of judicial review plays an equally important role, as the Court also
underscored in Schmerber:
Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings,
and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned. . . . The importance of
informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue
whether or not to invade another’s body in search of evidence of
guilt is indisputable and great.331
While these requirements obviously do not prohibit a search of the body, they provide
a significant constraint “against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances,
or which are made in an improper manner.”332
In applying these principles, the Court has required that probable cause support the
extraction of blood from a drunk-driving suspect,333 barred suspicionless drug testing
of maternity patients for purposes of identifying child-abuse suspects,334 and prohibited
the extraction of a bullet from a suspect’s body even in the presence of probable cause,
given the gravity of the intrusion.335 Prior to the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court similarly restricted the search of a suspect’s stomach under the Due
Process Clause336 and more recently has underscored the significant liberty interest
implicated when the state seeks to forcibly inject medication into a nonconsenting
person’s body.337 As these cases intuitively confirm, “The integrity of an individual’s
person is a cherished value of our society”338 and triggers “the greatest Fourth Amendment protection.”339
Outside the context of criminal law enforcement, the Court has relaxed the requirements of the Warrant Clause in certain circumstances to permit the state to conduct
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339

Id.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 770.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–86 (2001).
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766–67 (1985).
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22, 229 (1990).
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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otherwise impermissible body searches for civil or administrative purposes.340 The
authority that embraces these circumstances—the special-needs doctrine341—bears
directly on the permissibility of recent drug testing proposals insofar as the searches at
issue rest on neither cause nor a warrant. Under the doctrine, the Court engages in a
two-step analysis considering, first, whether the proposed search advances a “special
need” of the state, and, if so, whether the search strikes a reasonable balance between
individual privacy interests and the strength of the countervailing government objective.342 The doctrine has been used primarily to justify targeted drug testing programs343
but has been applied in other contexts as well—for example, to sustain a warrantless
home search conducted as a condition of probation.344
The first and central inquiry under the doctrine is whether the state’s special need
is sufficiently compelling to suspend otherwise applicable constitutional restrictions.345
In the absence of a special need, the analysis goes no further.346 While the need must
be unrelated to the ordinary demands of criminal law enforcement,347 a civil or administrative objective is not sufficient, standing alone, to satisfy the doctrine. In addition,
the need “must be substantial—important enough to override the individual’s acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment’s normal
requirement of individualized suspicion.”348 Although the formulation is highly indeterminate,349 the practical application of the doctrine has typically involved one of two
permissible objectives: the promotion of public safety and the related protection of the
health and security of schoolchildren under the state’s in loco parentis control.350 Regarding the first rationale, the Court has stated that “where . . . public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter
how conveniently arranged.”351 Regarding the second, the Court has “caution[ed]
against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional
340

See infra notes 345–52 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
342
See, e.g., 19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068, 1072
(10th Cir. 1998).
343
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner,
489 U.S. 602.
344
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
345
See, e.g., 19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs., 156 F.3d at 1072.
346
Id.
347
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665–66.
348
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).
349
See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special Needs Search
Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 34 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 165, 170 (2006); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the
Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 554 (1992).
350
See Budd, supra note 10, at 397–98; cf. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309.
351
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323; see, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836–37 (2002).
341
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muster in other contexts. The most significant element in this case is . . . that the Policy
was undertaken in furtherance of the government’s responsibilities, under a public
school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care.”352
There is considerable speculation about how far these two categories reach.353
While the Court has underscored in recent opinions that special needs constitute a
“closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches,”354
the decisional law demonstrates that the doctrine may be employed to permit suspicionless body searches in circumstances that only tenuously relate to the sanctioned
rationales.355 Regardless of how distant the two categories may extend, however, they
cannot rationally stretch so far as to justify suspicionless drug testing of the entire population of welfare applicants and recipients—for whom the state has neither in loco
parentis responsibility nor any encompassing public-safety concern.356 The constitutionality of such proposals is accordingly highly doubtful under conventional doctrine,
as Wayne LaFave and others have observed.357
2. Principled Adjudication
Accepting this conventional account of the Fourth Amendment, the district court
in the Michigan litigation concluded that the challenged testing program failed to
advance any recognized special need and was thus impermissible.358 The district
court first noted that the declared purpose of the authorizing federal statute was to move
welfare recipients to work, and that the state’s drug testing program rested on the
complementary objective of “address[ing] substance abuse as a barrier to employment.”359 Since neither goal touched remotely on a public safety concern, the
district court concluded that the testing program was irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s specification of permissible special needs.360
352

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).
See, e.g., supra note 349; cf. Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference:
Suspicionless Civil Searches in the Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223,
1231–34 (2004).
354
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001).
355
See, e.g., Aubrey v. Lafayette Parish Sch. Bd., 148 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding
suspicionless drug testing of school janitors on grounds that they hold safety-sensitive positions
and work closely with children).
356
See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.9(d) (3d ed. 2007) (“While
federal legislation authorizes states to undertake suspicionless drug testing of welfare recipients,
such action is not justified by . . . the Supreme Court’s drug testing decisions.”); see, e.g.,
Corinne A. Carey, Crafting a Challenge to the Practice of Drug Testing Welfare Recipients:
Federal Welfare Reform and State Response as the Most Recent Chapter in the War on Drugs,
46 BUFF. L. REV. 281 (1998); Socha, supra note 260, at 1118–19.
357
Id.
358
Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1139–40 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d by an
equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
359
Id. at 1140.
360
Id.
353
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The State nevertheless proposed that it sought to protect recipients’ children
from drug-related child abuse and thus pursued a safety-related objective as well.361
After noting the post hoc nature of the rationale,362 the district court addressed its
implications:
[This] excuse could be used for testing the parents of all children
who receive Medicaid, State Emergency Relief, educational grants
or loans, public education or any other benefit from the State. In
all cases in which the State offers a benefit on behalf of minor
children, the State could claim that it has a broad interest in the
care of those children which overcomes the privacy rights of the
parents. . . . “Such a categorical approach to an entire class of
citizens would be dangerously at odds with the tenets of our
democracy.”363
To the district court’s rejoinder might be added the fact that welfare recipients abuse
drugs at no greater rate than the general population364—and, thus, that the state has no
greater interest in stopping drug-related child abuse among welfare recipients than it
has with respect to the vast majority of other parents who receive some tax deduction,
credit, or similar subsidy on behalf of dependent children.365 Michigan’s child-safety
rationale would thus eviscerate the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of individualized
suspicion across the spectrum of American families—a result that is neither politically
nor doctrinally tenable.366
The court turned next to Michigan’s separate contention that its drug testing
scheme was authorized by the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyman v. James, which
upheld mandatory home visits by welfare caseworkers.367 The district court dismissed
the argument on two grounds. First, as the district court noted, Wyman held that the
home visits at issue did not even constitute a Fourth Amendment search and authorized
the entries, in part, on that basis.368 Since it is indisputable that invasive drug testing is
361

Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1141–42.
363
Id. at 1142 (quoting Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 342 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
364
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
365
See, e.g., Alan Berube, Individual Income Tax Credits as Social Policy in Rural America,
13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 151, 155–59 (2006).
366
Cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000). Outside the context of welfare, at least one other court has rejected a suspicionless drug testing proposal on grounds that
parents have no diminished expectation of privacy simply by virtue of the state’s general interest
in the well-being of their children. See State v. Moreno, 203 P.3d 1000, 1008–12 (Utah 2009)
(barring drug testing of the parents of delinquent minors for purposes of assuring that they
set a good example for their children).
367
400 U.S. 309 (1971); see Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43.
368
Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43; see Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317; supra notes
106–09 and accompanying text.
362
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a search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the Wyman analysis is obviously
irrelevant in that respect.369
Michigan argued, however, that Wyman’s alternative holding—that the home visits
constituted a reasonable entry under the Fourth Amendment370—supported its testing
program by establishing that welfare applicants have a generally diminished expectation
of privacy as a result of their voluntary request for assistance.371 The district court rejected the argument in light of the conflicting analysis in Chandler v. Miller, which
struck down a suspicionless drug testing program directed at candidates for public
office.372 As the court noted, the act of seeking elected office is considerably more voluntary than submitting an application for public assistance, which typically reflects
some measure of economic coercion.373 Nevertheless, the Chandler Court recognized
that candidates for political office possess a legitimate and defensible expectation of
privacy irrespective of the highly consensual nature of the activity at issue.374 Necessarily, then, welfare recipients must possess an equally defensible privacy expectation
in the substantially less voluntary context within which they interact with the state.375
Finally, the district court noted that Wyman predates the Supreme Court’s special-needs
jurisprudence and in particular the requirement articulated in Chandler that a safetyrelated justification support a special-needs search.376 “To the extent that Wyman could
be construed as allowing otherwise, its holding is no longer viable.”377
Unable to identify either a special need or a credible basis to defer to the fading
authority of Wyman, the district court enjoined Michigan’s testing program as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.378 In view of prevailing special needs authority, the
holding is a straightforward application of reasonably well-settled law.
3. Subconstitutional Adjudication
A three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court in an opinion
rooted in an entirely different, and frankly biased, set of analytic assumptions.379 The
opinion proceeds squarely in the tradition of the bifurcated Fourth Amendment and
offers arguments and rationales that are impossible to reconcile with conventional
369

Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43.
See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
371
Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143; see Wyman, 400 U.S. at 324.
372
520 U.S. 305 (1997).
373
Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
374
Id.; see Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
375
Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
376
Id. at 1143; see Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.
377
Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
378
Id. at 1144; see also Drug Tests as a Condition of Receiving Public Assistance, Op. Att’y
Gen. 07-84 (Tenn. 2007).
379
Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, judgment
vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
370
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authority.380 To make sense of the opinion, one must accept at the outset the premise
that the poor inhabit a different constitutional universe where their presumed culpability
justifies intrusions that are otherwise at odds with traditional doctrine. Throughout
the opinion, poverty is implicitly employed as a proxy for individualized suspicion as
the poor are cast as an inherently criminal, child-abusing, and drug addicted class.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision begins with the state’s asserted special need. To accommodate its substantive objectives, the court first reframed the governing standard
to drain the special-needs concept of virtually any limiting effect. Rejecting the pronouncement in Chandler that a permissible special need must be grounded in some
public safety concern,381 the court asserted instead that safety “is but one consideration”
and “need not predominate” in the special needs calculation.382 In support, the circuit
relied exclusively on Board of Education v. Earls,383 the Supreme Court’s latest opinion
dealing with the other rationale for a special needs search—the state’s in loco parentis
responsibility for schoolchildren under its care and supervision.384 In Earls, the Court
upheld a school’s suspicionless drug testing program for students involved in extracurricular activities on the expressly qualified basis that “Fourth Amendment rights . . .
are different in public schools than elsewhere; the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”385 Moreover,
within that uniquely supervisory context, the Earls Court accepted as “correct” the
proposition that “safety factors into the special needs analysis” but concluded that
“the safety interest furthered by drug testing is undoubtedly substantial for all children”
in the setting of a public school.386 To derive from Earls that safety “need not predominate”387 in a special-needs analysis beyond the context of public education—thus
trumping the express requirements of Chandler—is a “dubious conclusion”388 that
defies the terms of the opinion itself.
Having rewritten the constitutional standard to accommodate an open and undefined set of additional special needs, the Sixth Circuit proceeded to manufacture an
amalgam of rationales that bear no relation to any preceding authority and that render
the doctrine nearly limitless in its application to the general population. First, in a nod
to Chandler, the court embraced Michigan’s post hoc safety rationale for drug testing
and asserted without analysis that the program was designed to protect children from
380

See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 109, at § 10.3 (“[The opinion] misread Wyman and
reached the dubious conclusion that Earls, the Supreme Court’s latest school drug testing case,
trumped Chandler even outside a public school context”).
381
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
382
Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 335.
383
536 U.S. 822 (2002).
384
Id.; see Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 334–35.
385
Earls, 536 U.S. at 829–30 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
656 (1995)).
386
Id. at 836.
387
Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 335.
388
LAFAVE, supra note 109, § 10.3.
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drug-related abuse.389 In doing so, the court ignored the fact that the authorizing federal
statute as well as Michigan’s own policy rationale made no mention of child safety in
justifying the testing at issue,390 ignored empirical data refuting the premise that welfare
parents abuse drugs at a significantly greater rate than the general population,391 and
declined to acknowledge the necessary implication of its argument: that any parent
could henceforth be subject to suspicionless drug testing simply by accepting a childrelated state subsidy.392
Moving further beyond the record, the Sixth Circuit next imagined that the drug
testing program might advance an even broader public safety concern—“the risk to the
public from the crime associated with illicit drug use and trafficking.”393 Reasoning
now in a factual vacuum, the court conjured the image of welfare-subsidized drug
dealers preying on a victimized public and declared that the threat constituted yet another safety-related special need supporting universal drug testing among welfare
recipients.394 The characterization, however, bears no relation to available data establishing that no more than one in five welfare recipients even uses an illicit drug in a
given year,395 that no more than four percent of recipients are addicted,396 and that less
than six percent of applicants and recipients in related aid programs have lost benefits
based on drug-related criminal activity.397 The court’s analysis at this juncture mirrors
rational-basis review in the context of equal protection, where any imaginable justification is sufficient to sustain the state’s conduct irrespective of the record or the state’s
actual objectives.398 Rational basis review is essentially synonymous with no review at
all,399 and its application in this context reduces the special-needs inquiry to pretense.400
389

Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 336.
See Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d by an
equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
391
See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text.
392
See supra notes 363–66 and accompanying text.
393
Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 336.
394
Id.
395
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
396
See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text.
397
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-238, DRUG OFFENDERS: VARIOUS FACTORS MAY LIMIT THE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL LAWS THAT PROVIDE FOR DENIAL OF
SELECTED BENEFITS 13–15 (2005) (setting forth data from public housing programs).
398
See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
399
Id.; cf. Loffredo, supra note 9, at 1283–84 (“Indeed, in the nearly twenty years that this
rule has been in effect, the Court has not invalidated a single poverty classification or social
welfare restriction.”).
400
To the extent that the circuit’s imagined crime-fighting rationale might envision testing as
a means of identifying specific criminal suspects, it would also run headlong into the first and
primary restriction placed on special-needs searches—that they be employed only for purposes
“divorced from the State’s general interest in law enforcement.” Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989).
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Completing its reinvention of special needs, the court struck out beyond public
safety to declare yet another rationale for suspicionless searches—the state’s pedestrian
interest in the fiscal integrity of its benefits program.401 The court asserted, without
citation to any authority, that it is true “beyond cavil that the state has a special need
to insure that public moneys expended in the [program] are used by the recipients for
their intended purposes and not for procuring controlled substances . . . .”402 The implications of this claim are most sweeping of all. Applicable to virtually any government
benefit, the rationale establishes that the simple receipt of a tax deduction, credit, or
subsidy empowers the state to conduct warrantless and suspicionless searches to verify
that the beneficiary does not use the funds to buy contraband. There is virtually no one
left who, in the wake of such reasoning, might remain protected from suspicionless
searches to advance the state’s generalized interest in assuring that its ubiquitous
largesse is not diverted to the purchase of illicit drugs.403
Having devised an unprecedented set of special needs to justify Michigan’s testing
program,404 the Sixth Circuit was obliged to proceed to the next step of the specialneeds inquiry and balance the strength of the government’s rationale against the individual privacy interests at stake.405 Acknowledging that this inquiry required consideration of the efficacy of Michigan’s search policy in meeting the government’s asserted
goals,406 the Sixth Circuit declared that blanket drug testing was indeed an effective
method of addressing drug abuse—for the sole reason that Michigan’s program applied
universally to the applicant and recipient population and thus assertedly would catch
all abusers in its net.407 As discussed above, however, blanket drug testing is actually
an ineffective method of identifying drug-related abuse and associated dysfunction.408
The overwhelming majority of positive drug tests will be for the casual use of marijuana, which implicates none of the state’s purported concerns.409 Conversely, much
of the most serious drug abuse will avert detection due to the speed with which such
drugs are metabolized following ingestion.410 Rather than an effective means of addressing the state’s interest in drug-related abuse and crime, blanket drug testing of the
401

Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted,
judgment vacated, 319 F. 3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
402
Id. Notably, recent drug testing legislation has incorporated this rationale. A bill introduced in Louisiana in 2009 declares that the state has a “compelling interest in providing
safeguards to eliminate the misappropriation of entitlement benefits.” H.R. 137, 35th Reg.
Sess. (La. 2009).
403
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welfare population is precisely the kind of symbolic empty gesture that the Supreme
Court has repudiated as a basis for suspicionless searches in other contexts.411
The results of Michigan’s brief period of testing corroborate this conclusion. Of
the 258 participants, only twenty-one tested positive for an illicit drug, all but three of
whom for marijuana use alone.412 Thus, of the subject population, only 8.1 percent
tested positive for any drug, and only 1.2 percent were identified as using a serious
illicit drug.413 In the recounting of the Sixth Circuit, however, this data reduced to the
following fiction: “[T]he tests so far conducted have resulted in approximately ten
percent positive results, demonstrating that the means utilized by Michigan are effective
in detecting drug abuse among aid recipients.”414
Positing the efficacy of drug testing, the Sixth Circuit turned next to the countervailing privacy interests and predictably concluded that welfare recipients lack a defensible expectation of bodily privacy.415 The court based this conclusion on the novel
assertion that welfare is a heavily regulated “industry”416 that carries with it “a correspondingly diminished expectation of privacy.”417 In support of the proposition, the
Sixth Circuit cited—but did not quote—a passage from Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives’ Association that referenced the scope of industrial regulation in upholding
a drug testing program for certain railroad employees.418 The actual language of the
cited passage, however, demonstrates a quite different and especially unhelpful point:
“[T]he expectations of privacy of [the tested] employees are diminished by reason of
their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal
dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of the covered employees.”419
The diminished expectation of privacy in Skinner, then, was not a function of regulation generally but of the specific employees’ state-supervised obligation to protect
public safety—a concern that obviously offers no support for Michigan’s blanket drug
testing scheme.
The Sixth Circuit thus advanced a proposition bearing no relation to the holding in
Skinner: that the state’s general power to search regulated businesses420 establishes by
analogy an equivalent power to search the blood and urine of “heavily regulated” welfare recipients.421 It is not an elusive distinction, however, that
411
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the general acceptance of random inspection programs with respect
to the scrutiny of business premises does not support a comparable
approach as to drug testing of [individuals] . . . . Urinalysis in particular is more intrusive, as it involves a “basic offense to human
dignity.” This means, for one thing, that random drug testing
should be rarely allowed and only upon a showing considerably
more substantial than would suffice to support a random business
inspection scheme.422
Needless to say, the suggestion that a welfare recipient’s expectation of bodily privacy
is analogous to the privacy of a meat-packing plant is an improbable stretch. Were it
not, the Sixth Circuit’s argument would subject virtually anyone receiving a regulated
government benefit to suspicionless searches within the administrative scope of the
program in question. By unhinging privacy expectations from public safety, as in
Skinner, and linking them instead to the degree of government regulation, the court’s
argument would empower the state to unilaterally disable the Fourth Amendment—
since by simply increasing the extent of its regulatory intrusion, government would
simultaneously invalidate any countervailing privacy expectation.423 So construed,
the Fourth Amendment would be reduced to a perfectly circular nullity.424
The circuit completed its analysis by turning to Wyman v. James.425 “Even were
we to conclude that the state could not show a special need sufficient to justify the
drug testing,” the court declared, plaintiffs would still lose under Wyman.426 Reliance
on the superseded and idiosyncratic authority of Wyman to trump the special-needs
analysis, however, is impossible as a matter of ordinary adjudication. First, as the
district court noted, Wyman’s analysis rests on a variety of assumptions that are irreconcilable with more recent special needs authority, including the proposition that the
voluntary nature of a request for assistance generally diminishes a recipient’s expectation of privacy with respect to all related administrative interactions.427 If Wyman’s
voluntariness analysis were still good law, the Supreme Court’s subsequent specialneeds decisions in the employment context would have been reasoned in an entirely different fashion, since in each the individual’s relationship with the state was the product
of a voluntary employment arrangement that would have obviated any further inquiry
under the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning.428 Indeed, as the district court noted, the outcome
422
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itself would have changed in Chandler v. Miller, since the activity in question—
running for public office—is voluntary as well.429 Similarly, Wyman’s reference to
the state’s interest “in ensuring that the money it gives to recipients is used for its
intended purposes”430 echoes the Sixth Circuit’s effort to devise a special need on the
same fiscal-oversight grounds and suffers from the same insurmountable flaws.431
Thus, to accede to Wyman in the face of the conflicting requirements of the specialneeds doctrine necessarily requires that one accept a poverty-specific Fourth Amendment doctrine which, through Wyman, bypasses the protections afforded all others.
In dismissing special needs in deference to Wyman, this is precisely the conclusion
reached by the Sixth Circuit.
Beyond the fact that the special-needs doctrine supersedes Wyman and forecloses
its reasoning, the Wyman analysis itself provides quite limited support for the privacy
intrusion at issue in the Michigan litigation. In Wyman, caseworkers visited the homes
of welfare recipients for the specific purpose of assessing their needs and the welfare
of dependent children.432 The Wyman Court relied heavily on this rehabilitative objective to uphold the contested practice—emphasizing in particular that the entries were
friendly,433 involved no close inspection of the premises,434 and were designed not to
penalize program participants but to aid in their assistance.435 By contrast, drug testing
is punitive, invasive, and has only an attenuated connection to either the needs of recipients or the well-being of their children.436 Ignoring these differences, the Sixth
Circuit declared that the Michigan program was analogous to Wyman because “[t]he
State is attempting to insure that children are adequately cared for” and that “ascertaining whether the adult recipients . . . are abusing controlled substances is directly
related to that end.”437
Having thus mischaracterized all material aspects of the special-needs inquiry and
its relationship to Wyman, the Sixth Circuit reached the predestined conclusion that
Michigan’s drug testing program was constitutionally permissible.438 The breadth and
magnitude of the court’s analytic errors, and their improbable implications if applied
beyond the context of welfare administration, highlight the fundamentally different type
429
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of adjudication at issue here. To make sense of Marchwinski in light of the conventional Fourth Amendment, one must accept that the analysis operates outside the constraints of normal doctrine—as illustrated by the court’s desultory effort to reconcile
its reasoning with otherwise binding authority. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion inhabits
a separate and subconstitutional dimension of the law, demarcated by the court’s instinctive sense that welfare recipients are simply different when it comes to the question
of privacy. Within that separate sphere, poverty functions as a proxy for cause and the
requirements of individualized suspicion yield to the presumptive culpability of an
imagined class of drug addicts, criminals, and welfare queens.
The fate of Michigan’s testing program, however, was still not settled. On plaintiffs’ petition for en banc review, the full Sixth Circuit vacated the panel opinion,439
reheard the matter, and ultimately upheld the district court’s injunction by an equally
divided vote announced in a four-sentence order.440 That divided and conclusory resolution, while bringing an end to Michigan’s testing program, simply underscored the
broader challenges that face indigent litigants asserting privacy interests. The question
should not have been remotely close: neither the special-needs doctrine nor Wyman
provides any principled basis to inflict suspicionless body searches upon the entire
population of welfare recipients. The full circuit’s equivocation in addressing the
question merely deferred the issue to another day and compounded the sense that
few rights come easily to the American poor.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution remains an elusive and often hollow promise for impoverished
Americans. Facing doctrine that formally rejects both positive socioeconomic rights
as well as any meaningful protection against discriminatory state action, the poor as
a class are explicitly deconstitutionalized in relation to the law. Beyond doctrinal indifference, however, the indigent face affirmative bias as well. Across a range of fundamental interests, the judiciary has established a bifurcated system of rights enforcement
that denies indigent litigants the full force of otherwise applicable constitutional guarantees. The construed Constitution is thus not merely irrelevant but at times quite
hostile to the interests of those most in need of its protection.
This Article proposes a modest step forward in the effort to reset this constitutional
relationship: to finally repudiate the longstanding bias that burdens indigent litigants
seeking to vindicate basic privacy rights. In a series of decisions stretching from
Wyman to Marchwinski and Sanchez, the federal appellate courts have crafted a subconstitutional privacy doctrine that subjects welfare recipients to unique and humiliating
intrusions. The decisions reflect the familiar premise that the poor constitute an inherently culpable class and thus that poverty itself may be used as a proxy for cause in
439
440
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justifying suspicionless intrusions. In rejecting this caricature, the district court in
Marchwinski took the Constitution at its word and applied the Fourth Amendment on
its conventional terms to uphold the poor’s basic right to bodily autonomy. The prospect of litigation around the flood of new drug testing proposals may offer the federal
judiciary a chance to revisit its choice between these two starkly different visions of
the privacy right, and to finally remedy an enduring injustice.
The choice should not be difficult. Embracing neutral adjudication in this context,
however, would represent a decisive shift in the judiciary’s treatment of impoverished
Americans. The opportunity may soon arrive for the courts to take that small but defining step. It will be an occasion not only to redeem a corrupted doctrine but to affirm
for the poor the legitimating promise of constitutional adjudication itself.

